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Abstract 
A fundamental problem in knowledge representation is that reasoning, if based on classical 
logic, is inherently intractable or even undecidable. A principled approach to specifying more 
efficient inference mechanisms i  to use weaker logics with non-standard model theories. 
In this paper we extend earlier work on a logic of belief for decidable deductive first-order 
reasoning by adding the ability to introspect. The new logic allows us to formally specify the 
beliefs of deductively limited yet fully introspective first-order knowledge bases. The complexity of 
reasoning in this framework reduces to the complexity of a special validity problem of the logic and 
we obtain various tractability/decidability results. To demonstrate he usefulness of the logic for 
knowledge representation purposes we show how it can be applied to the specification of routines 
to query and update a knowledge base. Other interesting aspects of the logic include distinctions 
between knowing that and knowing who by way of quantifying-in and a very tight coupling 
between the limited beliefs of a knowledge base and those that follow under the assumption of 
perfect logical reasoning. 
Keywords: Knowledge representation; Belief logics; Limited reasoning; Introspection 
1. Introduction 
Knowledge representation systems usually need to represent incomplete and thus 
highly complex information. As a result, reasoning about this kind of information is 
computationally intractable if based on classical ogic. The following slight variation of 
an example by Moore [ 341 illustrates a major source of the complexity of reasoning 
about incomplete knowledge. 
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Suppose there are three blocks A, B, and C such that B is next to A and C is next 
to B. Furthermore let the color of A be green and the color of C be blue. Block B 
is hidden under a blanket and hence its color is not visible. 
While not immediately apparent, it follows that there must be a green block next to a 
non-green block. The reason why it takes (a little) thinking to arrive at this conclusion 
is because it takes reasoning by cases in order to arrive at it. In particular, a reasoner 
has to consider two cases, one where block B is green and another where B is not 
green. 
Reasoning mechanisms that allow for unrestricted use of case analysis are bound to 
be intractable or even undecidable. In domains like knowledge-based robots operating 
in a dynamic environment we are therefore faced with a serious dilemma. On the one 
hand, a robot needs to access vital information contained in its KB. On the other hand, 
a robot has to act in real time and cannot wait indefinitely for the KB to produce 
answers to queries. As a compromise, one could imagine that the KB gives up on 
computing all the logical consequences of its stored information and provides instead a 
limited inference service, which guarantees timely responses which are correct but not 
necessarily complete compared to full inference. For example, suppose a robot is faced 
with the above blocks world scene and is asked to make sure that there is a green block 
next to a non-green one. One way for the robot to satisfy this request is, of course, to 
use a theorem prover to determine that no action needs to be taken. Another way is to 
take a quick but shallow look at the information available to determine if the request 
has already been satisfied. If that is inconclusive, the robot might simply decide to move 
A next to C or to remove the blanket to determine B’s color. 
What should a limited inference mechanism look like? The obvious solution would 
be to use a complete inference engine such as a theorem prover and simply use a 
time-out or some other ad-hoc method to constrain it. While this can certainly produce 
a correct and efficient reasoner, there is a serious drawback in that we have virtually 
no control over what kinds of answers the reasoner might produce. In effect, we cannot 
tell by looking at the contents of the KB what the system actually knows. Such a 
knowledge representation system, whose functionality is largely unknown, seems highly 
undesirable. 
In contrast to these ad-hoc methods, there have been a number of approaches that ad- 
dress the problem in a more principled way [7,27,3 1,371. The main idea is to employ 
non-standard logics which specify weaker yet computationally more efficient deductive 
inference systems. The clear advantage of these approaches is that the inference mecha- 
nisms are well understood, that is, there are sound and complete algorithms with respect 
to the underlying non-standard semantics. 
It has long been recognized that agents should be able to introspect on their own 
ignorance. In the above blocks world scenario, the robot who uses only shallow reasoning 
needs to realize that he does not know that there is a green block next to a non-green 
one in order to initiate the appropriate actions. A more subtle use of introspection is 
revealed if we make the robot’s task slightly more complicated and ask him to ensure 
not only that a green block is next to a non-green block but also that he knows which 
green block it is. In this case, even a perfect logical reasoner will need to take action. 
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For he knows only that there is some green block adjacent to a non-green one but not 
which one it is (it could be either A or B). Again introspection is necessary for the 
robot to realize that. 
Previous approaches to limited reasoning have neglected introspection. A goal of this 
paper is to demonstrate that introspection can be added to a formal model of limited 
reasoning in a principled way without losing the computational advantages of the non- 
introspective model. We approach the problem by proposing a logic of belief based 
on earlier work [27], which allows us to formally specify the beliefs of deductively 
limited yet fully introspective first-order knowledge bases. The complexity of reasoning 
in this framework reduces to the complexity of a special validity problem of the logic 
and we obtain various tractability/decidability results. To demonstrate the usefulness of 
the logic for knowledge representation purposes we show how it can be applied to the 
specification of routines to query and update a knowledge base. Other interesting aspects 
of the logic include distinctions between knowing that and knowing who and a very tight 
coupling between the limited beliefs of a knowledge base and those that follow under 
the assumption of perfect logical reasoning. 
2. The approach 
Our point of departure is a limited deductive reasoner as presented in [27]. There 
we make explicit use of the idea that reasoning can be viewed as the problem of 
computing the beliefs of a knowledge base. Belief is modeled using a first-order modal 
logic called BU and the beliefs of a KB are simply those that follow logically in BL‘J 
from believing the sentences in the KB. Formally, if Bc$ denotes that 4 is believed, the 
beliefs of a KB are (CY I+ BKB > Ba}. The complexity of reasoning then reduces to the 
complexity of computing belief implications, that is, the validity of sentences of the form 
BKEI > Bu. It was shown that in our logic belief implication is decidable and in many 
cases tractable. The result was obtained by showing that belief implication is equivalent 
to a decidable form of first-order entailment proposed by Patel-Schneider [ 371. In a 
nutshell, decidability is obtained by ruling out certain forms of reasoning by cases. For 
example, neither B[ (p V -4) A (q V r)] 3 B(p V r) nor B[P(a) VP(b)] > BgxP(x) 
are valid in BL‘?. 
2. I. Introspection 
The above results were obtained under the assumption that beliefs are not nested. 
Thus we had no way in BLq to even talk about introspection within the logic. The goal 
of this paper is to extend the logic in such a way that we are able to specify introspective 
knowledge bases with good computational properties. 
At first, one might think that considering nested beliefs (with an appropriate seman- 
tics) is all we need to do. To show that this is not quite sufficient, assume, for the 
sake of argument, that we already have a belief logic with arbitrarily nested beliefs 
and a semantics that yields perfect introspection, that is, every belief is itself believed 
( + Bcr > BBa) and for every sentence an agent does not believe, he believes that he 
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does not believe it ( k ~Bcu > B7Ba). Now consider KB = p V q. Certainly, an agent 
with that KB should not believe p and, hence, by introspection, believe that he does 
not believe p. Note, however, that BlBp does not follow from BKB, that is, belief 
implications are not able to capture introspective knowledge bases. The problem is that 
the assumption BKB is much too weak for the desired conclusion because BKB only 
asserts that at feast KB is believed, thus not ruling out that p may be believed as well. 
What we need is an assumption that KB is, in a sense, all that is believed, which would 
then justify the conclusion that p is not believed. Following Levesque [ 321, we there- 
fore introduce a new operator 0, where Oa is read as (Y is all that is believed or LY 
is only-believed. Given an appropriate semantics of 0, we are then able to prove that 
O(p V q) 3 ‘Bp and hence O(p V q) > BlBp are valid in our extended logic. 
Reasoning in this framework can be thought of as determining which beliefs fol- 
low from only-believing a given KEL The complexity of reasoning thus reduces to the 
complexity of determining the validity of sentences of the form OKB > Ba. 
In our complexity analysis we will focus on knowledge bases which do not them- 
selves contain modal operators. What makes these KB'S particularly appealing from a 
knowledge representation point of view is the fact that they determine complete and 
fully introspective epistemic states. For example, for every sentence cy, either Bcu or 
~BCY follows from O( p V q) , 
2.2. Quantifying-in, standard names, und equality 
While the initial logic BLY does not address nested beliefs, it does address quantifying- 
in, which refers to the ability to use variables within a belief that are bound outside. This 
allows us to distinguish between knowing that and knowing who. For example, assume 
a detective knows that the murderer is the driver of the red car. While the detective then 
certainly knows that somebody is the murderer, 
k BMurderer( driver( red-car) ) > B&Murderer(x) , 
he will not necessarily know who the murderer is, 
&tBMurderer( driver( red-car) ) 3 &BMurderer( x) 
Semantically, this distinction is made possible in BL” by offering both rigid and non- 
rigid designators. In a nutshell, non-rigid designators are the usual terms of first-order 
logic like driver( red-car), whose denotation may change with different interpretations. 
Rigid designators, on the other hand, which we also call standard names, have fixed 
interpretations. In other words, they denote the same individual everywhere. Knowing 
who someone is then is modeled as knowing the individual’s standard name. 
With introspection and only-believing, the detective himself will now be able to 
reflect on these distinctions and know that the murderer, whoever it is, is not known 
to him because the driver of the red car is a non-rigid designator. Formally, let KB = 
Murderer( driver( red-cur) ) . Then 
/= OKB > B( &Murderer( x) A TBMurderer(x) ). 
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Quantifying-in is only of limited use unless we also have a distinguished equality 
predicate at our disposal. This way we are able to directly relate non-rigid and rigid 
designators. Suppose Eddie-Nogood is a standard name and assume our detective has 
determined that Eddie is the murderer. Using equality, we are easily able to incorporate 
this information into the detective’s KB. Furthermore, it then follows that the detective 
knows who the murderer is. Formally, let KB’ = KB A driver-( red-car) = E&ie_Nogood. 
Then 
k OKB’ > B( 3xMurderer( x) A BMurderer( x) ) . (1) 
As will be discussed in detail later on, equality is also very useful when evaluating 
queries with nested beliefs. In essence, it allows us to replace belief expressions by 
equality expressions, thereby reducing queries with nested beliefs to those without. For 
example, in order to evaluate the validity of (l), BMurderer(x) is first replaced by an 
equality expression that characterizes all the individuals of whom the detective knows 
that they are the murderers, which in this case is simply x = EddielVogood. Hence ( 1) 
reduces to 
+ OKB’ > B( JxMurderer( x) A x = EddieJVogood) . (2) 
2.3. Explicit versus implicit belief 
In [ 3 11, Levesque introduced the notions of explicit and implicit belief. From a KR 
point of view, the explicit beliefs are those that follow from an agent’s KB when we 
take into account his resource limitations. The explicit beliefs are therefore those which 
we have been talking about all along and which will be the main focus of this paper. 
The implicit beliefs, on the other hand, can be thought of as those that follow from 
the KB without any resource limitations. For example, implicit beliefs are closed under 
(classical) logical implication. 
To account for implicit belief, we add a new modal operator L to our logic, which is 
essentially a weak S5 operator. ’ We make this addition mainly for two reasons. For one, 
it allows a direct comparison between our new model of belief and a more traditional 
account. For another, our semantics of explicit and implicit belief exhibits a much tighter 
connection between the two notions than other approaches such as [ 6,3 11. In particular, 
we will show that for a given interpretation all implicit beliefs follow logically from the 
explicit beliefs. This narrow view seems justified from a KR point of view, where all 
the beliefs of the agent should be grounded in his KB. 
It seems plausible to allow an arbitrary mixing of L with the other modal operators 
B and 0. For example, consider the sentence BLp, where the agent is said to explicitly 
believe that he implicitly believes p. One way to make sense of explicitly believing 
implicit beliefs is to treat L’s inside B’s as if they were themselves B’s. That way, one 
could model agents that reason about implicit beliefs the same way as they reason about 
explicit beliefs. However, in favor of a simpler semantics we ignore this issue altogether 
I See [lo] for an introduction to the different modal logics such as weak S5. 
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by restricting the language so that the L operator may occur only outside the scope of 
a B or O.* 
3. Related work 
As already mentioned, this work builds on previous work on limited deductive reason- 
ing [ 271, which also discusses related work on limited deduction at length. Introspection, 
which is the focus of this paper, has received a lot of attention in KR, especially with 
regards to Moore’s autoepistemic logic (e.g. [ 17,32,33,35] ). All of these approaches 
work with implicit belief only, thus do not address resource limitations.” 
Konolige [ 161 seems to be the first to address the issue of modeling introspec- 
tion under resource limitations. However, rather than proposing an actual instance 
of a computationally attractive reasoner, he presents a general framework in which 
one can be formalized. Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis [4,5] attack the issue of reasoning 
under resource limitations including introspection by explicitly modeling proof-steps. 
In [ 161, Konolige also questions whether quantifying-in is compatible with nice com- 
putational behavior. His argument is that, while introspection in monadic predicate 
calculus is decidable, it becomes undecidable if we add quantifying-in. In this paper, 
we are able to at least partially absolve quantifying-in from being the computational 
villain. 
Except for the notion of limited belief, our logic shares many features with Levesque’s 
logic presented in [32], which in turn is based on [30]. In particular, we extend 
Levesque’s notion of implicitly only-believing to one of explicitly only-believing. Our 
treatment of implicit belief and quantifying-in are essentially like Levesque’s. Finally, 
this paper is based on and expands on the author’s Ph.D. thesis [26]. Various results of 
this paper have also appeared, in a preliminary form, in [ 21,22,28]. 
4. Paper outline 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5, we introduce the logic 
OBLIQUE, which defines the formal semantics of explicit belief, implicit belief and 
only-believing. In Section 6, we take a closer look at the connection between explicit 
and implicit belief in this logic. Next we concentrate on a class of sentences which, when 
only-believed, can be said to uniquely represent an epistemic state of an agent, which 
is of particular interest from a knowledge representation point of view. In Section 8, we 
focus on the problem of computing the explicit beliefs represented by a knowledge base. 
Finally, we apply our results to the specification of routines for querying and updating 
a knowledge base and provide an extended example. 
‘See [ 6 I for a logic that deals with implicitly believing explicit beliefs. 
’ A notable exception are Donini et al. [ 2 1, who characterize a decidable form of first-order introspective 
reasoning. The price they pay, however, is an underlying language with rather limited expressiveness. 
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5. The logic OBLIQUE4 
XI. The language 
Definition 5.1 (The language c3L). 
215 
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Primitives: The primitives of the language consist of countably infinite sets of 
variables, standard names, function and predicate symbols (of every arity ) including 
the equality predicate =. We denote the standard names by N. The function symbols 
are partitioned into two disjoint sets .7&o and P&, each of which contains infinitely 
many function symbols of every arity. 
Terms: A term is either a variable, a standard name, or a function symbol whose 
arguments are themselves terms. 
Closed terms: A closed term is a term not containing any variables. 
Primitive terms: A primitive term is either a constant or a function symbol whose 
arguments are standard names. 
F-terms: Anf-term is a term other than a variable followed by the symbol a. (The 
meaning of f-terms and that of extended terms below will become clear once we 
discuss the semantics of the logic in Section 5.2.) 
Extended terms: An extended term is either a term, an f-term, or of the form 
.f(hv..., tk ) , where f is a k-ary function symbol and the ti are extended terms. 
(In other words, f-terms may not occur nested within an extended term.) ’ 
Atomic formulas: Atomic formulas (or atoms) are predicate symbols with extended 
terms as arguments. 
Primitive formulas: A primitive formula is an atom whose arguments are standard 
names. 
Formulas: A formula is either an atom or can be obtained by the usual rules for 7, 
V, 3, L, B, and 0, provided that no L occurs within the scope of a B or 0. For 
technical reasons, we require that no variable is bound more than once within the 
scope of a modal operator. 
Ordinary formulas: Ordinary formulas are formulas without any occurrences of 
f-terms. 
Basic formulas: Basic formulas are formulas that do not contain any occurrences 
of L or 0. 
Objective formulas: Objective formulas are formulas that contain no modal opera- 
tors. 
Sentences: Sentences are formulas without free variables. 
Notation. Other logical connectives like A, > , 3, and V are defined in the usual 
way. In order to distinguish standard names from ordinary constants syntactically, we 
denote them as #1,#2,#3 ,.... We use infix notation for the equality predicate and 
4 Thanks to Hector Levesque, who suggested that name to me. It may be read as ‘Only-Belief Logic with 
@antifiers and @mlity”. 
5 For example, f(a) * and g(a,b*,h(a*)) are f-terms. f(x*), where x is a variable, and 
g(a, b*, h(a*)*) are not. 
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write ti # t2 instead of -( tl = t2). true and false are used as shorthand for (# 1 = 
# 1) and (# 1 Z # I), respectively, with the obvious intended meaning. Sequences of 
terms or variables are sometimes written in vector notation. E.g., a sequence of variables 
(xl, . , xk) is abbreviated as X. Also, 3x stands for 3x1 . .3xk. If a formula LY contains 
the free variables xl,. ,xk, a[xl/ll,. ..xk/tk] denotes (Y with every occurrence of 
xi replaced by t;. If it is clear from the context which variables are being replaced, we 
sometimes simply write a[ ti , . , tk I. 
5.2. The semantics of basic sentences 
In our model-theoretic characterization of OBLIQUE, we first turn to the semantics 
of basic sentences only, that is, sentences without occurrences of O’s and L’s. Since 
the semantics of basic sentences is a direct extension of the semantics of the logic BLY 
of [27], we begin by describing informally the main ideas underlying BLq and then 
discuss the necessary modifications to account for nested beliefs and equality. 
The semantics of BLq combines ideas from relevance logic [ I], in particular, a 
fragment of relevance logic called tautological entailment [3], with a possible world 
style interpretation of belief [ 1 1, 12, IS]. 
From possible world semantics BL” borrows the idea that an agent in a given state 
of affairs is able to imagine (or access) other states of affairs, which determine his 
epistemic state. Except for a special treatment of existential quantification described 
below, the agent’s beliefs are simply those sentences that hold in all those accessible 
states of affairs. 
In classical possible world semantics, the states of affairs are called worlds and each 
world is essentially a first-order structure as we know it from classical logic. In contrast, 
the states of affairs in BLq, which are the same in OBLIQUE, are more general first- 
order structures, which we call situations. Instead of assigning either true or false to a 
sentence, situations assign independent true- and false-support, an idea borrowed from 
tautological entailment of relevance logic. In other words, situations are four-valued in 
that a sentence at a situation may have true-support, false-support, both, or neither. As 
was already shown in [ 3 I], belief based on four-valued situations is no longer closed 
under modus ponens. While this presents already a substantial departure from classical 
logics of belief, substituting worlds by situations alone does not result in a decidable form 
of belief implication, which was one of the goals of BLq. For that purpose, existential 
quantification within belief is restricted in an intuitionistic fashion. In ordinary possible 
world semantics, a sentence &P(x) is believed just in case in every accessible world 
there is an individual such that P holds for that individual. In BLq we require the agent 
in addition to know a term t such that P(f) holds in all accessible situations. Note that 
in both cases the individuals that satisfy P may vary among the accessible situations. 
However, in BLY the agent also needs to know a common description like the driver of 
the red car. As a result of this modification, believing P(a) V P(b) no longer implies 
believing &P(X) in BLq. 
If it were not for quantifying-in, the extension from non-nested beliefs in BLq to nested 
beliefs in OBLIQUE would be straightforward. In fact, without changing the semantics 
of BL“ at all, we obtain a model of nested beliefs with perfect introspection simply 
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because the accessible situations are the same for all situations in a given model.6 To 
understand the complication introduced by quantifying-in, let us go back to the detective 
example from Section 2.2. In the semantics for non-nested beliefs [ 271, the detective’s 
belief that someone is the murderer, B&Murderer(x), is satisfied just in case the 
detective imagines a set of situations uch that there is a term like driver( red-cur) 
and Murderer(driver( red-cur)) holds in all situations. Now we want to express, in 
addition, that the detective does not know who the murderer is, expressed as 
B( &Murderer( x) A lBMurderer( x)). 
If we just substitute driver(red_cur) for x as before, we obtain that 
(3) 
Murderer( driver( red-cur) ) A lBMurderer( driver( red_car) ) 
holds in all situations the detective thinks possible, which leads to a contradiction because 
of perfect introspection. In order to fix this problem, we need a better characterization 
of knowing or not knowing who someone is. In our example, it simply means that the 
detective does not know the identity of the driver of the red car. We can formalize 
this idea by saying that the detective does not know of the denotation of the term 
driver( red-cur) that he or she is the murderer. In order to convey this distinction between 
a term and its denotation we use f-terms, which were already introduced syntactically in 
Definition 5.1. Thus, when substituting driver( red-cur) for x in (3)) we use the f-term 
driver( red-cur) A inside the modal context and obtain that 
Murderer( driver( red-cur) ) A lBMurderer( driver( red-cur) *) 
holds in all situations. More specifically, in every situation s which the detective imagines 
Murderer( driver( red-car) ) holds, yet it is not known of the individual denoted by 
driver( red-cur) at s whether he or she is the murderer. 
We begin our formal investigations with the definition of situations, which form 
the core of the model theory. Situations are first-order structures with a universe of 
discourse, a denotation function mapping terms into the universe of discourse and two 
sets T and F of primitive formulas. T contains primitive formulas which are considered 
to have true-support and F contains those considered to have false-support. The true- 
and false-support of arbitrary objective sentences i  then defined in the usual recursive 
fashion, keeping in mind that there need to be separate rules for true- and false-support. 
If the sets T and F partition the primitive formulas, we obtain the equivalent of a 
classical two-valued world. However, we allow the two sets to overlap arbitrarily and 
not every primitive formula needs to be in either T or F, thus giving us a four-valued 
semantics in general. The universe of discourse is fixed for all situations and is simply 
the set of all standard names. This choice allows a proper treatment of quantifying-in 
and also simplifies the formalism, since quantification can be understood substitutionally 
and situations only need to deal with primitive formulas in the definition of true- and 
false-support. 7 
6 This corresponds to the logic weak S5 of classical possible world semantics (see, for example, [lo]). 
’ A more detailed discussion of using standard names as the universe of discourse can be found in [ 301. 
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Definition 5.2 (Denotation function). A denotation function d is a mapping from 
closed extended terms into the standard names such that the following three condi- 
tions hold: 
(I) d(n) =n ifn E N. 
(2) d(f(tl,...,tk)) =d(f(d(tl),...,d(tk))) forterms f(tl,...,tk). 
(3) d(tA) =d(t) for f-terms tn. 
Note that denotation functions do not treat f-terms in any special way. As will be seen 
later on, f-terms receive their special status only in connection with the interpretation of 
the modal operators. 
Definition 5.3 (First-order situations). A situation s is a triple s = (T, F: d), where T 
and F are subsets of the set of primitive formulas and d is a denotation function. 
T and F can be arbitrary sets of primitive formulas except for equality, which has a 
fixed interpretation. 
( I) (n = m) E T iff n and m are identical standard names. 
(2) (n = m) E F iff n and m are distinct standard names. 
Worlds are situations with a classical two-valued interpretation of primitive formulas. 
Definition 5.4 (Worlds). A situation w = (TW, F,, dW) is called a world iff 
P(n) E T,,. +=+ P(n) @ FW for all primitive formulas P(n). 
The following definitions (Definitions 5.5-5.7, 5.9, 5.11, 5.13, 5.15) all have to do 
with the interpretation of B. The reader may want to skip them on a first reading and 
consult them only when necessary. 
Definition 5.5 (Objective level oj’ a formula). A primitive or formula contained in a 
formula CY occurs at the objective level of LY if it does not occur within the scope of a 
modal operator. 
Definition 5.6 (Existentially quantified variables). Let LY be a formula in O,C. Let x be 
a variable that is bound at the objective level of some formula p such that either p = LY or 
B/3, Op, or Lp is a subformula of LY. x is said to be existentially (universally) quantijed 
in LY iff x is bound within in the scope of an even (odd) number of T-operators in p. 
In other words, a variable is existentially quantified if it occurs in an even number 
of negation signs relative to the nearest enclosing B, 0, or L (if any). For example, in 
3x~B3yP( x, y), both x and y are considered existentially quantified. 
Definition 5.7 (Admissible terms). Let LY be a formula and x existentially quantified 
in cy. A term t is said to be an admissible substitution for x with respect to a iff every 
variable y in t is universally quantified in LY and x occurs within the scope of y. 
If the context is clear, we often say t is admissible for x or t is admissible. 
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Note that an admissible term for x may contain at most those variables that would 
appear if we were to skolemize x in the usual way.’ 
Example 5.8 (Admissible terms). Let a = 3xVy3zP(x,y,z) A BQ(x,z). Then only 
closed terms are admissible terms for X. The admissible terms for z, are precisely those 
terms that contain at most y as a variable. For example, f(a), where a is a constant, and 
h( y, y) are admissible. x, z, and g(u), where u is a new variable, are not admissible 
for z. 
Definition 5.9. Let a be a sentence and let x = (XI,. . . , xk) be a sequence of the 
existentially quantified variables bound at the objective level of cr. (~a denotes CI with 
all 3xi removed. 
Example 5.10. Let LY = 3wVx3y~(w,x,y) A BIzQ(z). Then ns = VxP(w,x,y) A 
B3zQCz). 
Note that existential quantifiers within modalities are left untouched. 
Definition 5.11. A formula Q is existential-free iff (Y contains no existential (universal) 
quantifiers at the objective level within the scope of an even (odd) number of l- 
operators. 
Example 5.12 (Existential-free). Examples of existential-free formulas are ~3xP( x) 
and VxP(x) A B3yq(x, y). On the other hand, VxP(x) A 3yQ(x, y) is not existential- 
free. Note that only the objective level of a formula matters. Note also that as is 
existential-free for every (Y. 
Definition 5.13. Let a be a formula with free variables x = (XI,. . . ,xk). (a may 
contain other free variables as well.) Let t = (tl , . . . , tk) be a sequence of terms. 4x/t] 
is (Y with every occurrence of Xi at the objective level replaced by ti and every occurrence 
of ni inside the scope of a modal operator replaced by tin if ti is not a variable and by 
ti otherwise. 9 
Example 5.14. Let a and b be constants and let (Y = P( xl) A BQ( x1, x2, x3). Then 
~xl/a,x2/b,x3/#271=P(a) AB9(a *,b*,#27). 
Note. The difference to cr[xl/a,x2/b.x3/#27] = P(a) A BQ(a,b,#27), that is, [.I 
indicates regular substitutions, while c.1 indicates that substitutions within modalities 
use f-terms. 
Definition 5.15. Let a be a sentence and s = (Z’, Ed) a situation. CY~ is obtained from 
(Y by replacing every occurrence of tA by the standard name d(t), if t is closed, and 
by t otherwise. 
8 As a matter of fact, these restrictions on admissible terms are more convenient than essential. What really 
matters about admissible terms is that they do not introduce new free variables. 
9 Variables are exceptions because they cannot be made into f-terms, i.e., xiA is not an f-term. 
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Example5.16. Let a=P(&) AVxB(tJ(f(x)A) VR(&)) and s= (T,F;d) such that 
d(a) = # 1. Then (Y’ = P(# 1) A V.rB(Q(f(x)) V R(# 1)). 
The true- and false-support for basic sentences can now be defined. Let s = (rY, F,, d,) 
be a situation and M a set of situations. Let P(t) be an atomic sentence and let LY and 
/3 be sentences except in rule (4), where a may contain the free variable X. 
Let x = (XI,. , XI) be a sequence of the existentially quantified variables bound at 
the objective level of a. 
(5 ) M, .skr Bcz c=+ there are admissible t such that 
for all s’ E M, M,s'kT a"a[.r/tj, 
M,.s/=~ BLY t-7. M,s& Ba. 
Notation. Since the semantics of an ordinary subjective sentences c only depends on the 
set of situations in question, we usually write Mk=, CT (M/=, CT) instead of M, sF~ (T 
(M, sbF a). Similarly, for objective a we simply write s/=r cy or s/=r a, since M only 
plays a role if a sentence mentions a belief. 
To get a better understanding of the interpretation of B, let us look at an example: 
Example 5.17. Let M = {s ( s& P(a)} for some constant a. 
Claim. MkT B(SW(x) A -BP(x)). 
Proof. Let a = 3xP(x) AlBP(x). By definition, MkT Bu iff V’s E M, M, skT a"3[x/tJ 
for some admissible t. Note that, in this case, (Y” = a because cy does not contain any 
f-terms. 
Note that cy”~[x/u] = P(a) A ,BP(nA). It suffices to show that 
for all s E M, M, s/=~ P(a) A ,BP(a*). 
Let s = (T,, F,, d,) be any situation in M. M, s&, P(a) follows immediately from the 
definition of M. 
To show that M, s& lBP(an), assume that d,(a) = n for some standard name n. By 
the definition of M, there must be a situation s’ E M with a different denotation function 
such that s’k P(n). Therefore, M,s& 7BP(n) which implies M,sh 7BP(a*). 0 
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5.3. Maximal sets 
Before turning to the definitions of implicit belief and only-believing, we need to 
address a complication, which has to do with the fact that there are far more sets of 
situations than there are basic belief sets, that is sets of all basic sentences that are 
believed at some set of situations. For example, let M = {s 1 sh p} for some atomic 
sentence p and let M* be M with an arbitrary situation s removed. One can show that 
M and M* still believe the same basic sentences. It turns out to be very convenient 
to restrict the semantics of belief to certain canonical sets of situations, which we call 
maximul sets. lo In a nutshell, maximal sets are those which cannot be extended without 
changing some of their basic beliefs. (In the above example, M is maximal while M* 
is not.) As far as basic beliefs are concerned, using only maximal sets or not does not 
make any difference, which is reassuring. The benefit of maximal sets will become clear 
once we define the meaning of 0 and L. 
We start out with the definition of basic belief sets. For simplicity, we only consider 
basic beliefs without f-terms. 
Definition 5.18 (Basic belief sets). A set of ordinary basic sentences r is called a basic 
belief set if there is a set of situations M such that r = {CX ) Mh Ba, where (Y is an 
ordinary basic sentence}. 
Theorem 5.19. Basic belief sets are uniquely determined by their existential-free ob- 
jective sentences. 
Proof. This theorem was proven in [24] for a variant of our notion of explicit belief. 
The proof carries over with only minor modifications. 0 
This theorem is actually surprising since Levesque has shown that in the case of 
implicit belief (which we define below) basic belief sets are not uniquely determined 
by their objective sentences [ 321. 
Definition 5.20 (Equivalence of sets of situations). Two sets of situations Ml and M2 
are equivalent (Ml = M2) iff their basic belief sets are the same. 
Definition 5.21 (Maximal se?s) . A set of situations M is maximal iff no proper superset 
of M is equivalent to M. 
Note that the empty set is a maximal set. This is easy to see because {}b Bfalse 
and for all non-empty sets M, MpT Bfalse. 
Definition 5.22. For any set of situations M, let M+ = {s ) M c M U {s}}. 
‘” Levesque introduces a similar notion in his paper on implicit belief and only-believing [ 321. 
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Since M U {s} = A4 for all s E M, we obtain immediately that M C M+. In the 
following, we will show that M+ is maximal, that is, M + is the unique largest superset 
equivalent to M. 
Theorem 5.23. For any set of situations M, M z Mi and for all sets of situations M’ 
such that M z M’, M’ C M+. 
Proof. ( 1) To prove M E M+, it suffices to show that M and M+ agree on all ordinary, 
objective, and existential-free sentences (Theorem 5.19). Assume to the contrary that 
there is an ordinary, objective, and existential-free sentence LY on which M and Mf 
disagree, that is, since M 2 Met, Mb=, Bcx but MfFT Ba. In other words, there is an 
S* E M+ such that s/& LY (note that cy is existential-free). But then M $ M U {s*), a 
contradiction. 
(2) Now we need to show that for every set of situations M’ such that M’ z M, 
M’ C: M+. Let s E M’. In order to show that s E M+, it suffices to show that 
M E M U {s}. In particular, it suffices to show that M and M U {s} agree on all 
ordinary, objective, and existential-free sentences. Since M’ = M by assumption, for all 
ordinary, objective, and existential-free sentences a, if MbT Bcx then s+~ LY. Therefore, 
if M& Ba then MU{s}b B a as well. Thus MU {s} has at least the objective beliefs 
M has. On the other hand, since M C MU {s}, MU {s} h as certainly no more objective 
beliefs than M. Thus M and M U {s} have the same objective beliefs and hence the 
same basic belief sets. Cl 
The following LWO corollaries are immediate consequences of Theorem 5.23. 
Corollary 5.24. M+ is unique and maximal. 
Corollary 5.25. For any maximal sets oj’ situations M and M’, if M z M’, then 
M=M’. 
The following corollary gives us an alternative characterization of M-’ 
Corollary 5.26. For any set of situations M, 
M ’ = {s 1 for all ordinar); objective. and existential-free sentence LY, 
if MbT BLY then M,sb, LY }. 
Proof. Let us denote the right-hand side by M”. 
M* C M+: Let s E M’. Then, since for all ordinary, objective, and existential-free 
sentences cr, if MkT Ba then M, s/=~ a, M and MU(s) agree on all ordinary, objective, 
and existential-free beliefs. Thus they agree on all ordinary basic beliefs and, hence, 
M = M U {s}. By the definition of M+, s E M+ follows. 
M’ C M*: Let .I‘ E M+. By the definition of M+, M E MU {s}. Therefore, M and 
M U {s} agree on all ordinary, objective, and existential-free sentences. Thus, for any 
such sentence cy. if M& Ba, then s& a. Hence, s E M*. El 
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Corollary 5.27. For all basic sentences y, sets of situations M, and situations s, 
M, +=,y ifM+,~+~y and M,si==, Y WffMf,s~F~ 
Proof. A simple induction on the structure of y (omitted). 0 
The main result of this section has been that maximal sets can be taken as unique 
representatives of basic belief sets. In particular, as pointed out in Corollary 5.27, as far 
as basic sentences are concerned, it does not matter whether one considers arbitrary sets 
of situations or just maximal ones. 
5.4. The semantics of implicit belief and only-believing 
The semantics of implicit belief is a slight modification of classical possible world 
semantics. The only difference is that f-terms need to be taken care of as well. Their 
treatment is the same as for explicit belief. 
M, So La w for all worlds w E M, M, w/=~ LY’, 
M,+, La e M, skT La. 
Note that implicit beliefs are interpreted only with respect to classical worlds contained 
in the set of situations M. Furthermore, in contrast to explicit belief, there is no special 
treatment of existential quantifiers. In fact, their treatment is the same as in classical 
possible world semantics. For example, M, sh L3xP( X) iff for every world w in M 
there is a standard name n such that w\~ P(n) . 
As for only-believing, the basic intuition is that a set of situations M only-believes a 
sentence LY iff M is the largest set that believes a. There is, however, one complication 
that needs to be addressed. Consider the sentence a = 3xP(x). What should it mean 
for M to only-believe a? Since a necessary requirement is that M believes a, there 
must be some closed term a such that MbT BP(a). It may be tempting to let M = {s 1 
s/==r P(a)} for some closed term a. But that seems too strong. For example, to say that 
all the detective believes is that someone is the murderer conveys a lot less information 
than all the detective believes is that the driver of the red car is the murderer. 
One way around this problem is to require the terms that are used when only-believing 
an existentially quantified sentence to convey no information about the world. In other 
words, the terms should behave like Skolem functions or internal identifiers. For that 
reason, the function symbols of c3C have been partitioned into two sets, the regular 
function symbols 3nno and the set 3sk, whose members we also call sk-functions. 
Then Mb:T 03xP(n) just in case M = {s ( So P(a)} for some constant a E 3s~. 
Finally, the idea that function symbols in 3s~ do not convey information about the world 
can be dealt with pragmatically when using the logic to specify interaction routines for 
querying and updating a KB. In particular, a user is restricted to a language without 
function symbols from 3s~. Thus the KB is told information about the world using only 
sentences mentioning functions in 3aao. Those in 3s~ are reserved for internal use by 
the KB. (See Section 9 for more details on this.) 
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Before turning to the formal definition of only-believing, it is worth pointing out that 
the above problem does not arise in the case of implicitly only-believing as studied 
by Levesque [ 321. There, the sentence &P(x) is implicitly only-believed just in case 
M = {w 1 w is a world and w/=r &P(x)}. It is easy to see that M is the largest set of 
worlds such that M+r L3xP(x). Note that, in contrast, &P(x) is not even explicitly 
believed at {s 1 s is a situation and s/=r &P(x)}. 
Definition 5.28 (Sk-terms). Let LY be a sentence and x an existentially quantified 
variable bound at the objective level of LY. Let U(x) be a sequence of the universally 
quantified variables in whose scope x is bound. Let f E .Fsk be a function symbol of 
arity JU(x)) occurring nowhere else in (Y. Then f( U(x)) is called an Sk-term (for x). 
Note that an Sk-term is also an admissible substitution. 
Let a be a sentence, where x = (XI,. . , xk) is a sequence of the existentially 
quantified variables at the objective level. 
M, s/=r Oa G==$ there is a sequence of Sk-terms tsk for x 
such that for all s’, .s’ E M iff M, s’+r aS’[X/tskj 
M.S/=rOLY M M,&.OLY. 
Truth, logical consequence, validity, and satisjability in OBLIQUE 
The notions of truth, logical consequence, validity, and satisfiability are defined with 
respect to worlds and maximal sets of situations only. 
A formula N is true at a maximal set of situations M and a world w if M, wkr cy. (Y 
is false if M, wpT LY. A sentence cy is logically implied by a set of sentences r (r /= a) 
iff for all maximal sets M and worlds w, if M, w/=, y for all y E r, then M, wF~ a. 
A formula (Y is valid (b a) iff LY is logically implied by the empty set. (Y is satisjiable 
iff T(Y is not valid. 
5.5. Properties of the logic 
In this section, we discuss properties of the logic with an emphasis on the various 
forms of belief. The purpose is not to provide an exhaustive analysis ” but to concentrate 
on those properties that relate the various notions of belief to the classical ones. In 
subsequent sections, we will study in detail the usefulness of the logic for KR purposes. 
Since we care mostly about ordinary sentences, we restrict our attention to that class 
only. t* 
It is not hard to see that OBLIQUE subsumes the logic BLY of [27]. In particular, 
the semantic rules of OBLIQUE, restricted to the language 0 of BLY, reduce to those 
” An exhaustive analysis would include a complete axiomatization of the logic, which may be difficult to 
find. Even in the case of implicit belief and implicitly only-believing, Halpem and Lakemeyer [ 91 showed 
recently that Levesque’s axiomatization 132) is incomplete in the first-order case. Furthermore, it is easily 
seen that any complete axiomatization of Levesque’s logic is non-recursive. 
‘* With few exceptions, the properties discussed in this section carry over directly to sentences with f-terms. 
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of BLq. In addition, as far as basic sentences are concerned, it does not matter whether 
or not maximal sets are used (Corollary 5.27). 
55.1. Implicit belief 
Ordinary implicit belief satisfies all the properties of weak X5, that is, beliefs are 
closed under classical logical consequence and full introspection. In fact, apart from the 
additional treatment of f-terms, L is nothing but Levesque’s notion of implicit belief as 
described in [ 321. We therefore will not go into any more details regarding implicit 
belief and turn right to the properties of explicit belief. 
5.5.2. Explicit belief and only-believing 
Let cr, p and (+ be ordinary sentences not containing L. Let p and u, in addition, be 
subjective and let n be a standard name. (Proofs can be found in the Appendix.) 
Perfect introspection 
(1) t=B~a>BBcu, 
(2) k ~Bct > BlBa. 
Quantifying-in 
(3) + Ba;: > 3xBa, 
(4) k 3xBcu 3 B3xcu, 
(5) + Ba; > BSIxtu, 
(6) b V’xBcu > BV’xcu provided a is existential-free, 
(7) b BVX(Y > VxBa. 
Logical omniscience for subjective sentences 
(8) I= (WP 3 (T) ABP) 3 Bg. 
Accuracy and (partial) completeness of subjective beliefs 
(9) + (Bp A TBfalse) > p, 
(10) + p 1 Bp provided p is existential-free. 
Relating only-believing and explicit belief 
(11) +OU >Ba. 
Relating explicit belief and implicit belief 
(12) /=Ba >La. 
Note that explicit and implicit belief of ordinary sentences have the same properties 
regarding introspection and quantifying-in. Also, similar to the propositional case, an 
agent’s explicit beliefs lack logical omniscience only about the world, not about what is 
believed. In fact, explicit belief of subjective sentences is very similar to weak S5 except 
for the proviso in property ( 10). The connection between explicit belief and implicit 
belief on the one hand ( 11) and between only-believing and explicit belief on the other 
(12) are as expected. 
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6. The connection between explicit and implicit belief 
In the last section, we observed that believing a sentence explicitly logically implies 
that the sentence is also believed implicitly. While this is not surprising, it turns out that 
there is a much stronger connection between the explicit and implicit beliefs at a given 
set of situations. The following theorem says that if we are given only the basic beliefs 
of an agent (and, by Theorem 5.19, we only need to consider objective ones), then we 
can reconstruct all beliefs including what the agent only-believes and what he implicitly 
believes. 
Theorem 6.1. Let r = {a 1 Mb,,- B LY, where CY is basic and ordinary} be the basic 
belief set for a maximal set of situations M. Let y be any ordinary sentence (except in 
part ( 1 ), where y may not contain any L’s). Then 
(I) M~~OyifS{Bcu/aET}U{lB~ILy~r}~OOY. 
(2) MkT Ly ifs {Bcu / a E I‘} U (7Bcu / a 6 T} b Ly. 
(3) M/=TLyiffr+y. 
Proof. ( 1) To prove the only-if direction, let M& Oy and let M’ be a maximal set 
such that M’bT {BCX 1 a t r} U (7Ba / a @ IT}. Thus M and M’ agree on their basic 
belief sets, i.e., M E M’. By Corollary 5.25, M = M’ and, therefore, M’kT Oy. 
To prove the if direction, let {Ba ) a E I‘} U { -Ba / cy $! r} /= Oy. By the definition 
of r, we obtain immediately that Mb=, {Ba / a E r} U (7Ba ( cy @ r} and, therefore, 
Mkr 0~. 
(2) The same argument proves part (2) with Oy replaced by Ly. 
(3) To prove the if direction, assume f b y, that is, for all maximal sets of situa- 
tions M’ and worlds w, if M’, wkr r. then M’, w& y. Since, by the definition of r, 
MbT BCX for all cy E I-, Mk7. La for all cy E r holds as well (by property ( 12) above). 
Next, let w be a world in M. (If M is empty, then M/=r Ly holds vacuously.) Then 
M, w+~ (Y for all cy E r. Thus M, wbr r and, therefore, M, wbT y. Since this holds 
for all w E M, Mb=, Ly follows. 
Conversely, assume that MbT Ly. Let M’ be a maximal set of situations and w a 
world such that M’, w+~ f. We need to show that M’, w+~ y. Note that, if LY E r, then 
Ba E r. Also, if a +Z r, then 1Bcu E r. Therefore, M and M’ agree on all basic beliefs, 
that is, M z M’. Since both M and M’ are assumed to be maximal, by Corollary 5.25, 
M = M’. 
Since, by assumption, M’, wkT /‘, we obtain, in particular, that for all ordinary, objec- 
tive, and existential-free a E r, if M’br Ba then M’, w& cy. Thus, by Corollary 5.26, 
rv E M’. Since M = M’ and M& Ly by assumption, M’kT Ly. Finally, since w E M’, 
M’,w/=, y. 0 
If we had used non-maximal sets, neither what is only-believed nor what is implicitly 
believed would follow from the explicit beliefs and non-beliefs: 
Example 6.2. Consider the following sets of situations M and M’, where p and q are 
distinct atomic sentences. 
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M’ = {s ( skT p} - {w ( w is a world and wpr q}. 
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The only difference between M and M’ is that q is true at all the worlds contained in 
M’. It is easy to see that M and M’ agree on all explicit beliefs. (Note that M’ is not 
maximal and M’+ = M.) However, M’ implicitly believes q while M does not! 
The question may arise why one should not allow epistemic states as modeled by M’. 
The answer is that, from a KR point of view, it is hard to imagine that an agent whose 
beliefs are represented by a KB has implicit beliefs that cannot be inferred from his KB 
or, for that matter, from his explicit beliefs. Since the purpose of the logic OBLIQUE 
is to form a formal basis of a KR system, it seems appropriate to aim for a model 
theory that matches our intuitions as tightly as possible. Incidentally, none of the other 
approaches in the literature that deal with both explicit and implicit belief, such as [ 311 
and [ 61, addresses this issue. They all allow epistemic states, where agents may have 
implicit beliefs independent of their explicit beliefs. A more detailed study of this issue 
can be found in [ 231. 
7. Determinate sentences 
So far our discussion of OBLIQUE has been quite independent from any representa- 
tional aspect, that is, nothing depended on whether or not the beliefs of an agent are 
in any way represented symbolically. In the rest of the paper we will study OBLIQUE 
specifically from this knowledge representation point of view. 
We begin with a closer look at how and to what extent the logic allows us to draw 
a connection between a knowledge base and a corresponding epistemic state (= set of 
beliefs). The range of possible epistemic states in OBLIQUE is defined by the different 
maximal sets of situations. Only knowing defines a mapping from knowledge bases 
into epistemic states for many sentences. For example, given the primitive formula 
P(n), (3 I &P(n)) is the only set which satisfies OP( n). Hence we obtain that 
for every sentence (Y, either Ba or 7Ba is logically implied by OP( n). For sentences 
with existential quantifiers such a nice mapping generally does not exist. For example, 
03xP(x) is satisfied by {s 1 s&.P(a,k)} f or every constant in &. Note, however, 
that these sets of situations are very similar. In particular, it can be shown that they 
agree on all beliefs that do not mention Sk-functions. Thus if we restrict epistemic states 
to consist of beliefs without Sk-functions, 03nP( x) again represents a unique epistemic 
state. As was mentioned before, we do not really limit ourselves by disregarding beliefs 
with Sk-functions. In a sense, all we do is reserve Sk-functions to be used only as internal 
identifiers of the system. A user who asks queries and updates the KB is unaware of 
them and uses function symbols only from the set .&a,$ With these observations, we 
call a sentence LY determinate if Oa is uniquely satisfiable after replacing all existential 
quantifiers at the objective level of Q by Sk-terms. 
Not all sentences are determinate. This is because 0 is essentially an autoepistemic 
operator. For example OBP( n) is not satisfiable at all and 0( BP (n) > P(n) ) is satisfied 
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by exactly two sets of situations, namely (s 1 s/=~ P(n)} and the set of all situations. 
Having multiple epistemic states in cases like this one is completely analogous to the 
multiple stable expansion phenomenon of Moore’s autoepistemic logic [35]. We will 
not discuss the autoepistemic aspect of OBLIQUE here. The interested reader is referred 
to [28] instead. See also [32] in the case of only-believing and implicit belief. 
We now investigate determinate sentences in more detail. The rest of this section 
is organized as follows. After formally defining determinate sentences in OBLIQUE, 
we show that all objective sentences are determinate. We then prove that determinate 
sentences uniquely determine epistemic states without Sk-functions (Theorem 7.5). The 
main result of this section is that, if a determinate sentence is only-believed, the question 
whether an ordinary basic sentence is explicitIy believed reduces to the question whether 
an ordinary objective sentence is believed (Theorem 7.15). 
Although the results in this section hold for non-basic as well as for basic sentences, 
we by and large ignore the non-basic part because it will not be used later on. Restricting 
ourselves to basic sentences also simplifies the presentation, 
First we introduce some convenient notation. 
Definition 7.1. Let M be a set of situations, LY an ordinary basic sentence and let x 
be the existentially quantified variables at the objective level of CX. Let t be admissible 
terms (or Sk-terms) for x. If BQ or Oa holds for t at M, we use the abbreviation B’a 
and O’cy, respectively. Formally, 
Mk, B’cu iff for all situations s, if s E M, then M,s& d[x/tj, 
kfbT O’a iff for all situations s, .F E M iff M,s/=r d[x/tJ. 
Definition 7.2 (Determinate sentences). Let (Y be an ordinary, basic sentence and x 
a sequence of the existentially quantified variables at the objective level of cy. cx is 
determinate iff Oru is satisfiable and for all admissible Sk-term substitutions t of x and 
for all sets of situations MI and M2, 
if Ml/===, O’LY and Mzbr O’a, then Mi = MT. 
Informally, Definition 7.2 says that for any Sk-term substitution of the existentially 
quantified variables of a determinate sentence the corresponding epistemic state is 
unique. 
Lemma 7.3. Every ordinary objective sentence is determinate. 
Proof. Let a be an ordinary and objective sentence. First, if (Y is existential-free and 
M/=r Ocr for a set of situations M, then s E M iff s/=r LY, which follows straight from 
the definition of 0. Thus M is unique in case (Y is existential-free. 
Now let LY be an arbitrary ordinary objective sentence. Let M/=r OCX and M’kr Oa 
such that M+r O’a and M’& @a for Sk-terms t. Since cr is objective, this is 
the same as M& Ocus [x/t] and M’b Ocus [x/t]. Therefore, since as [x/t] is 
an existential-free objective sentence and existential-free objective sentences are only- 
believed at a unique set of situations, A4 = M’. 0 
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The following lemma is useful for the main results of this section. 
Lemma 7.4. Let C#I : .F -+ F be a bijection over function symbols such that f and 
$4 f > are of the same arity for all f, and 4(f) E .FREG (4(f) E 3’s~) iff f E &G 
<f E FSK). 
For a given situation s = (T, F, d) define sb = (T, Ed+) such that 
d,+(f(n)) =d(4(f)(n)) forallprimitive terms f(n). 
For any (not necessarily maximal) set of situations M, let M4 = {q 1 s E M}. For 
any formula a (term t) , let #* (a) (6 (t) > denote a ( t) with every function symbol 
f replaced by 4(f). If cx is basic, then 
(1) M4,s4/==Ta ifSM,sbC(a), M4,s4kFa ifSM,sk=,dr*(a). 
(2) if M is maximal, then Mb is maximal. 
Proof. ( 1) is proved by induction on the structure of (Y. First, a simple induction 
argument on the structure of terms shows that for any denotation function d and term t, 
d&t) = d(4*(t)) (omitted). 
Base case: M$,s~, P(t) iff P(d,(t)) E TS+ iff P(d,(4*(t))) E T, iff M,sb 
qb* (P(t) ) . The argument for +r is completely symmetric. 
Induction step: The cases for 1, V, and 3 follow easily by induction. Let 
Md,s,& Bcu 
iff M~,s;+~ (aQ)g[t] for some admissible t and for all sb E M$ 
iff M,s’k, c$*((a”+)a[t)) for all s’ E M by induction 
iff M,s’+, fl(cx)“a[+*(t)) for all s’ E M (note that 4*(aS+) =4*(a)” 
because d,(t) = d,(fl(t)) 
by the definition of d,, ) 
then M, sh 4* (Bar) because r#~* (t) is admissible. 
Conversely, let 
M, +r 4* (BQ) 
then M,s’k=, q(a>“a[t’) for some admissible t’ and all s’ E M 
then M,s’k=, @*(a)“s[+*(t)) f or some admissible t, which must exist 
because @+ is bijective 
then M+ s+F~ Ba by the same argument as above. 
(2) Let M be maximal. To prove that Mg is maximal, it suffices to show that 
M$ G M,+ Let s E Mt. Then, since q!~ is bijective, s = si for some s’. 
Let (Y be an ordinary, objective, and existential-free sentence. By Corollary 5.26, if 
M&/=, Bcu, then M+, SF* LY. Therefore, using part ( 1) of the lemma, if MbT B#? (a), 
then M, s’b c$* (a). Note that, since 4 is bijective, +* is a bijection over ordinary, 
basic and existential-free formulas as well. Thus we obtain that for all ordinary, basic, 
and existential-free LY, if Mb=T Ba, then M, s’kT CL Hence s’ E M, which implies 
4 =sEM+ Cl 
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We can now show that determinate sentences as defined above in fact deserve their 
name. 
Theorem 7.5. Let CY be a determinate sentence. For any ordinary basic /3 without 
s/?-functions, exactfy one of /= Oa 3 BP arzd b Ocu > -BP holds. 
Proof. Let M and M’ be two maximal sets of situations such that M/=r Oa and 
M’/=r Ocr. Then Mkr 0’ CY and M’/=r OUa for admissible Sk-terms t and U, respec- 
tively. Now dehne a bijection 6 : .F - .F such that 4* (t) = II and all f E .&no are 
mapped onto themselves as well as those f E Fsk that occur in (Y. Let ML = ($4 / s E 
M’} as defined in Lemma 7.4. 
First, we show that Mb/=,r 0’~. By assumption, M’kr O’CY, i.e., for all situations s, 
s t M’ iff M’,s+r &[u) By the definition of 4, cr~[u)= ~,4*(&t)). Therefore, by 
Lemma 7.4, for all s, s c M$, iff M$,s/=, cd[tl that is, Mi+r O’a. 
Let /3 be basic and without Sk-functions. By Lemma 7.4, M’br BP iff M$/=r BP 
because 4*(p) = p. Also, since (Y is determinate and both M/=r O’cu and M&k:, O’cu, 
M = M$,. Thus M/=r B/3 iff M’/=r BP. 
Since this holds for arbitrary maximal M and M’ such that M/=r Ocu and M’& OLY, 
the theorem follows. Cl 
The rest of this section is concerned with proving that, if a determinate sentence is 
only-believed, the question whether an arbitrary ordinary sentence is explicitly believed 
reduces to the question whether an ordinary objective sentence is believed. Since the 
proof is fairly involved, we begin by sketching the main ideas first. 
Definitions 7.6 and 7.10 describe the transformation from believing an arbitrary sen- 
tence to believing an equivalent objective sentence. ‘s The idea is as follows. Suppose a 
determinate sentence y is only-believed. The question whether a sentence LY is believed 
can be transformed into the equivalent question whether a certain objective sentence is 
believed by performing the following transformations on cy. For any subsentence B/? 
in CX, where p is objective and does not contain free variables, replace B/3 by true 
or false depending on whether the belief holds at M or not. In case /? contains free 
variables, replace BP by an equality expression as described in Definition 7.6. This ex- 
pression describes precisely for which standard name substitutions of the free variables 
the belief holds at M. Most importantly, although there may be infinitely many standard 
names that can be substituted, these can always be captured with aJinite equality ex- 
pression. It is not hard to see that, if these substitutions are performed according to the 
definitions, that is from the innermost beliefs to the outermost ones, the result will be 
an objective sentence. 
Lemmas 7.8 and 7.13 provide the justification why these transformations are legiti- 
mate. Other lemmas are needed for technical reasons. Finally, the main result appears 
in Theorem 7.15. 
Definition 7.6. Let y be a determinate sentence, M a set of situations such that 
M/=r Oy, and cy an ordinary formula possibly containing free variables. Let nt , . . . , n, 
I7 By the way, the same process applies in the case of implicit belief 132 I 
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be all the standard names occurring in y or (Y, and let n* be a standard name not 
occurring in y or Ly. 
true, if LY is closed and Mb Ba, 
false, if (Y is closed and M+=F Ba, 
R&QM, a]l = V( (x = ni) A =SsUM, a;J, 
V (A(x + ni> A ~SB[M, a;*]:*) 7 
otherwise, where x is free in cy. 
Lemma 7.7. Consider a bijection Y : N - N. For a given situation s = (T, F, d) 
define sy = (TV, 6, d,) s. t. f or any primitive formula P( nl , . . . , nk) and primitive term 
f(nl,...,Q>, 
For any set of situations M let M, = { sy 1 s E M}. Y is extended to apply to terms and 
formulas in the usual way. Let M be a set of situations, s a situation, and Q a basic 
sentence. Then 
(I) M,, s& v(a) iff M, Sk,- a, MVV s& ~(4 ifM skF ff. 
(2) If M is maximal, then M, is maximal. 
Proof. ( 1) Induction on the structure of cy. (First, a simple induction shows that for 
any denotation function d and closed term t, d,(u(t)) = v(d(t)) (omitted).) 
If Q is atomic, then there are two cases: 
(a) a = P(t) for an arbitrary predicate symbol P other than =. 
(b) cy = (t = t’) for closed terms t and t’. 
Let s = (T, E d) with s,, = (TV, F,,, dy) as defined above. 
(a) skT P(t) iff P(d(t)) E T iff P(v(d(t)) E TV by definition of T, iff 
P(d,(y(t))) E T,, by definition of d, iff sybT P(y(t)). (The proof for kF is analo- 
gous.) 
(b) s+~ (t=f) iffd(t) =d(t’) iff y(d(t)) =v(d(t’)) (because v isabijection) 
iff d,(v(t)) = d,(y(t’)) iff s,& v(t = t’). 
The cases for 1, V, and 3 follow easily by induction. 
Let M,, svh v( Ba) and let x be the existentially quantified variables at the objec- 
tive level of cy. Then there are admissible t for x such that for all s: E M,, M,, s; k:T 
v ( CY)‘~ al[x/t ) Since v is bijective, there are terms t’ such that t = v( t’) and the t’ 
are admissible as well. Also, since dS, ( ZJ( t)) = v(d,( t)), v(a) sv = v(d). There- 
fore, for all s: E M,, M,, s:b v(c8) $[x/z~(t’) 1 and, by induction, for all s E 
M, M, sh &g[x/t’b which implies Mh BCY. 
Conversely, let M, sb Ba. Then there are admissible t such that for all s E M, 
M,sk=, cu”g[t]. By induction, for all S; E M,, Mv,$,bT v(&g[t]). 
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Since the y(t) are admissible and v(cv)‘~ = V( my), we obtain that for all 3: E M,, 
MY,~L/===T v(~)%~[x/v(t)~ which implies M,,J,~~ v(BQ). 
(2) Assume that M is maximal. In order to prove that M, is maximal, let s be any 
situation and assume that for all ordinary, objective, and existential-free cy, if MY/=:T Ba, 
then s/==r LY (*). By Corollary 5.26, all we need to show is that s is in M,. 
First, since Y is bijective, s = .$, for some s’. By assumption (*), for all ordinary, 
objective, and existential-free LY, if MYbT Bv( LY), then s;/=~ v(a). Thus, by part ( 1) 
of the lemma, if MbT Ba, then s’/=~ a. 
Finally, by Corollary 5.26, s’ E M and by the definition of M, , s; (= s) E M,. 0 
Lemma 7.8. Let y be u determinate sentence and a an objective formula with free 
variables x1, . . , xk. Let A4 be a set of situations such that h4kT Oy. Then for anq’ 
s E M and anq’ substitution of closed terms rl, , tk for XI, . , xk, 
(Note the use of [ .) on the right-hand side, making sure that tin is substituted for x,. 
See also the example below. 1 
Proof. By induction on the number of variables in (Y. Let LY have no free variables. 
Then M, sbT RE$[M, LYE iff RE&(jM, LYE = true iff M, s/=~ Ba. 
Assume the lemma holds for k variables. Let cy have kf 1 variables. Let t be a closed 
term intended as a substitution for the variable x with d,(t) = n. 
Case I: n occurs in y or a. 
M,s~~RESB[IM,~n[t,,...,rk,t] 
iff M,s/=~ ((x=n) ARESB[JM,cu;:)IJ[tl,...,tk,t]) 
(all other candidates are not satisfied because d,(t) = n) 
iff M, s/=~ RE$[M, LYE] [ti, . , tk] 
iff M, sk.r (Bcu,“)[tl , , tkj (by induction) 
iff M,s+, (Bcu)[tl,. .,tk,t) 
Case 2: n does noI occur in y or a. 
M,s~=, RESB[M,~][tl,. ..fk,fl 
iff M,s/===, R.ES~[M,&~~[tl,. .tk,t] 
iff M,,,s,~=,RESB[[M,cu~n:[v(tr),...,v(tk),v(t)l 
(by Lemma 7.7, where v is a bijection over standard names that swaps 
n and n* and that is the identity function otherwise) 
iff M,,s,~~RESsuM,cu~.l)[y(tl) . . . . . U(tk)] 
(since d,YV(Y(t)) =n*) 
iff MY,sV& (B~~,)Cy(t]),...,V(tk)l (by induction) 
iff M, s& (BaG)[tI,. . , fkj 
(by Lemma 7.7) 
iff b’f,+=, (Ba)[t,, . . ,tk, t]. cj 
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To illustrate the previous lemma, let us consider an example. 
Example 7.9. Let y = P(# 1) A P(#2), LY = P(x), and M = {s ) shy}. It is easy to 
see that MkT Oy. For any situation s = (T, F, d) and closed term t we obtain 
M,+r RW(M,a) ttl iff M,S+r (t=#l) V (t=#2) 
iff d(t) =#l or d(t) =#2 
iff M, skT BP( tA) 
iff M,sb BP(n)~t~ 
The following definition describes how to convert any ordinary basic sentence into an 
objective sentence. Lemma 7.13 shows that this transformation is indeed equivalent to 
the original sentence. 
Definition 7.10. Let y be a determinate sentence and M a set of situations such that 
MkT Oy. Let a be an ordinary basic formula. 
lla\lM = a> for objective LY, 
II-+r = +\IM* 
llLy ” PllM = k& ” II&i> 
lI3xallM = 3+jlMt 
IIB~IM = RESLI[M~ II~IM]. 
Lemma 7.11. Il~~yllM is objective. 
Proof. A simple induction on the structure of LY. Omitted. Cl 
Lemma 7.12. ((cd 11~ = ~JcY((M$. 
Proof. A simple induction on the structure of CY. Note that cw# only removes existential 
quantifiers at the objective level and I( . (1~ d oes not alter the objective level of a 
formula. Cl 
Lemma 7.13. Let y be a determinate sentence and M a set of situations such that 
MkT Oy. Let a be an ordinary basic formula with free variables x = (xl,. . . , xk) and 
let t = (tl, . . . , tk) be a sequence of closed terms. 
My sky 4xltl i8 M, skT Il~ll~[~/~l~ 
M, sI=~ dx/tl iff M9 skF IblIMvI[x/tl. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of cy. Let t A = (t, A, . , . , tkA). If CY is objective, 
the lemma holds trivially because at]= ((allM[t]. 
Given the definition of (Icx~((M, the cases for 7, V, and 3 follow easily by induction. 
Finally, 
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M, + W)CtJ 
iff M,s/=~ B(cx[tn]) by definition of [t 1 
iff M, s’/=~ a[tn]“a[t’l for some admissible t’ and for all s’ E M 
iff M,s’/=, a[n]~[t’J for 4(t) = II 
iff M, s’& cza[n, t’l 
iff M,s’bT /JcGJj~[rz,t’] by induction 
iff M, s’/=~ llaiiM~ [n, t’] by Lemma 7.12 
iff M,s’/=~ lJ+[tn]~‘~[t’] 
iff M,4=,B(ll4~It~l) 
iff M,sk=, RE$[M, ilallM][t] by Lemma 7.8 
iff M, S/==T (IBal/M[t] by definition of /I . l/M. 
Lemma 7.14. Let cy be an ordinary determinate sentence. Let M and M’ be maximal 
sets of situations such that MbT Ocu and M’kT Oa. Then for any ordinary basic 
formula p without Sk-functions, IIPJIM = JIPI(M~. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of p. If p is objective, the lemma 
holds trivially because IlPli~ = p = IIpll~f. 
The cases for the logical connectives 7, \/, and 3 follow easily by induction using 
the definition of /I Jj. 
Let us now consider /IBpll~ = R!Z&[M. IIPIJMJ and IIBpII~~ = RE$[[M, IIpllM,I]. Thus 
we need to show that FE$(IM, Ilpll~l] = RE&lM, /lpll~~~. By induction, llpll~ = //P//M!. 
By Theorem 7.5, M and M’ agree on all explicit beliefs that do not mention function 
symbols in +FsK, With that, a simple inductive argument on the number of free variables 
in /3, using the definition of RE&, establishes that RES,/M,Pj = RE&[M’,Pl. 0 
Now we can finally prove that determining whether an arbitrary basic belief follows 
from only-believing a determinate sentence reduces to determining whether a certain 
objective belief follows. 
Theorem 7.15. Let y be an ordinary determinate sentence and cy an ordinary basic 
sentence, which does not contain function symbols in .?&. Given Lemma 7.14, I/cY(/M 
is the same for all M such that M& Oy. Hence let us write I/LY(( instead of /(cYIJM for 
such M. Then 
/= Oy > Ba if + Oy > Bllcrll. 
Proof. Let MkT Oy. Then M/y Bcx iff M& llBa/J~ (by Lemma 7.13) iff MbT 
RESB[M, llc,$] (by definition of 1). I/) iff MbT Bl(all (by Lemma 7.8). Thus, whenever 
M/y O-y, Mb Bcu iff M& BJIczJI and we are done. 0 
Note that this result rests squarely on the definition of I(LYI(M (Definitions 7.6 and 
7.10). In this regard, = plays a crucial role in turning a basic sentence into an objective 
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one. It is mainly for this reason that = was introduced as a two-valued, or classical, 
equality predicate rather than a four-valued one as all the other predicates. 
In summary, this section introduced determinate sentences, which determine complete 
epistemic states as long as these do not mention sk-functions. An important result was 
that basic beliefs without Sk-functions that follow from only-believing a determinate 
sentence reduce to objective beliefs. While interesting in its own right, this result will 
play an important role in the next section on decidability results in OBLZQUE. 
8. Decidability results 
In this section, we are concerned with the problem of deciding whether a basic 
belief follows from only-believing an objective sentence. We restrict our attention to 
ordinary sentences only. So far we have obtained complexity results only for subclasses 
of sentences. Note that, while Theorem 8.10 is subsumed by Theorem 8.11, the former 
has been included as a special case because it has a much simpler proof than the more 
general case. We begin by noting that, if we restrict ourselves to a propositional language 
without equality, reasoning is in fact tractable. 
Definition 8.1. A basic quantifier-free formula LY is in conjunctive normal form, if LX 
is a conjunction of disjunctions, where every disjunct is either a literal or of the form 
BP or 7BP such that p itself is in conjunctive normal form. 
Theorem 8.2. Let a and /? be basic quantifier-free sentences without equality in con- 
junctive normal form. Furthermore let CY be objective. Then the validity of Oa > BP 
can be determined in 0( IcxJ x I/?\). 
Proof. This theorem is a slight variant of a result in [ 281. 0 
In order to address the complexity of reasoning in the quantificational case, we first 
need to establish some results regarding various validity preserving transformations on 
sentences of the form Oa > BP and Bcr > BP. 
Lemma 8.3 (Skolemization) . Let a be an ordinary objective sentence with existentially 
quantijed variables x, /3 an ordinary basic sentence whose function symbols are in DREG 
or contained in a. Then 
b Oa 3 B/? i# /= Oa$ [x/t J > BPfor Sk-terms t. 
Proof. Assume b Oa > BP and let Mh Oas[x/t]. Thus s E M iff skr era [x/t] 
for Sk-terms t. In other words, M+r Oa which implies, by assumption, Mb B/3. 
Conversely, assume + Oaa [x/t] > BP for admissible t and let Mb Oa. Then 
M = {s 1 skT cd [u] for some Sk-terms II }. 
Define a bijection 4 : 3 - 3 such that +* (t) = u, $J( f) = f for all f E 3&o, 
and 4(f) = f for all f E 3s~ that occur in a. Then #*(d[x/t]) = (Y~[x/u]. 
Since Mb Oas [ X/U] = $* (ns [x/t] ), by Lemma 7.4, M4b=, Oaa [x/t] and thus, 
by assumption, Mgkr B/I. Since +* (p) = p, by Lemma 7.4, Mh B/3. 0 
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Lemma 8.4. Let (Y be an ordinary, objective, and existential-free sentence. Let CYPCNF 
be LY in prenex conjunctive normal form. Then /= Ba E BCYPCNF and k OCI E OCYPCNF. 
Proof. A similar result was proven for the logic BLY of [26,27]. Since the proof 
generalizes in a straightforward way, it is omitted here. 0 
Definition 8.5. For any ordinary objective sentence (Y, let %[a] = {s 1 s/=~ a}. 
Given the definition of R[a], it is easy to see that 
Lemma 8.6. For any ordinary, objective, and existential-free a, %[a] is maximal and 
xra1 l=.T Oa. 
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from the definition of X[(Y] and the fact that 
cy is existential-free. 0 
Note that the lemma does not hold for arbitrary objective sentences containing exis- 
tentially quantified variables. For example, if cy = jxP(x), then %[a] &cIT OLY. In fact, LY 
is not even explicitly believed at %[LY]. 
Lemma 8.7. Let LY be an objective, ordinary, and existential-free sentence. Then for 
any ordinary basic sentence /3, 
Proof. Since (Y is objective and existential-free, there is a unique %[a] such that 
LR[cr] /==T Oa. What is left to show is that %[a] kT BP iff $?[a] bT BIIflll~~~l. 
?JZ[ a] +.r BP iff there are admissible t such that for all s E k??[ a], !R[ a], skT ,@[tl iff 
there are admissible t such that for all s E X[cu], ?I?[ a], sb /lj311arn~ 3 [t] by Lemmas 
7.12 and 7.13 iff !J?[cr]k, BIIPllaral. 0 
Lemma 8.8. Let (Y and /3 be ordinary objective sentences, where cy is existential-free. 
+OOLYIB/? iff /=BBLY>BP. 
Proof. Assume /= Bcu I B/3 and let MkT 0~. Then MkT Bcx and thus, by assumption, 
Mi==T BP. 
Conversely, assume /= Oa 3 BP and let M& Bcr. Then M C LR[ a]. Since !R[ a] kT 
Ocz, !J?[ (w] h BP by assumption and thus Mb BP. q 
Lemma 8.9. Let cz and /3 be ordinary objective sentences, where (Y is existential-free. 
Let x = (xl,. . . , xa) be a sequence of the existentially quantified variables in p. 
/=BcY>B/? I# bBa>BP+/t] 
for some admissible terms t for x. 
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Proof. Only-if direction: Assume k Ba > BP. We show that we can choose an admis- 
sible t for the existentially quantified variables in p independent of the set of situations 
in question. 
For that reason, let us consider M,, = {s ) skT CY}. Since LY is existential-free, i.e., 
(Y = aa, Mm&r Bn. l-h en, by assumption, Mm&r BP, i.e., for some admissible t 
and for all s E Mmax, sb /3$ [ t] . 
Now consider any set of situations M such that Mk=T Bar. Since cy is existential-free, 
sb (Y for all s E M and, therefore, M C M,,,. Thus for all s E M, sh ps [t], 
where t are the same admissible terms as in the case of M,,. Finally, since @ [t] is 
existential-free, Mk=, BPS [ t] . 
Zf direction: Conversely, assume that + Ba > B@ [t] for some admissible t and 
let M+r Ba. Then Mb BPa[ t], i.e., for all s E M, sb Pa[t] (since pa [t] is 
existential-free), from which MkT BP follows immediately. 0 
Theorem 8.10. Let (Y be an ordinary objective sentence without equality. Let p be an 
ordinary basic sentence without equality or quantifying-in, i.e., no subformula By of /I 
contains free variables. Then the validity of OLY > B/3 is decidable. 
Proof. 
bO0cu3B/? 
iff k Ocr’ 13 B/3 where LY’ is LY with all existentials replaced 
by Sk-terms (Lemma 8.3) 
iff t= OCI! > B((P(]ala~l by Lemma 8.7 
iff + Ba’ > B]J/3((~1~~1 by Lemma 8.8 because IIPl]~l~rl is objective. 
Since ]]P]]~,a,l is objective, it suffices to show the decidability of the validity problem 
for Ba’ I BP’ for an arbitrary objective and existential-free cy’ and any objective p’ 
which is the result of )).)) W[~,). A simple induction argument then shows the decidability 
of l[P]l~,~,l, where p is basic and without equality and quantifying-in. This, together 
with the above equivalences, establishes the decidability of k Oa! > BP. 
Given the restrictions on p, it is easy to see that we only need to consider objective 
/3’ whose only occurrences of equality expressions are of the form (# 1 = # 1) and 
(# 1 + # 1 ), which we denoted as true and false (see Definition 7.6). Let /?” be p’ 
with occurrences of true and false removed in the usual manner (e.g., (y V false) 
reduces to y) . Thus either p” = true or p” = false or p” has no occurrences of true 
or false. Then /= Ba’ > BP” iff p” = true or /3” has no occurrences of true or 
false and Ba’ > B/I’ is valid in BLq, which was shown to be decidable in [ 26,271. 0 
In [26,27] it was shown that belief implication, that is, the validity problem for 
sentences of the form Bcr > BP, where both (Y and /3 are ordinary objective sentences 
without equality, is equivalent to Patel-Schneider’s t-entailment [ 371. Patel-Schneider 
shows that, while t-entailment is intractable in general, it is efficient for a large class of 
sentences that are relevant from a practical point of view (e.g., queries can be assumed 
to be at most logarithmic in length with respect to the size of the knowledge base). 
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From the proof of Theorem 8.10 it is obvious that the complexity of introspective 
reasoning is dominated by the complexity of belief implication. Thus in the case where 
belief implication is efficient, the extension to introspective reasoning is efficient as well. 
Hence, at least in cases without quantifying-in and equality, there is really no penalty 
to be paid when moving from a purely deductive reasoner to an introspective one. 
In a generalization of Theorem 8. IO, we now allow some form of quantifying-in and 
show that reasoning is still decidable. 
Theorem 8.11. Let (Y be an ordinary objective sentence without equality. Let /3 be an 
ordinary basic sentence without equalit?’ such that any free variable x in a subformula 
By in p is a universally quantijed variable in p. In other words, only universally 
quanti$ed variables may participate in quantifying-in. Then the validity of Ocz > B/3 is 
decidable. 
Proof. See Appendix. U 
The theorem shows that, in the case of limited reasoning, quantifying-in does not 
necessarily push us over the decidability edge, thus at least partially absolving the 
poor computational record quantifying-in has in classical modal logic as noted in [ 161. 
While Theorem 8.10 only allows quantifying-in for universally quantified variables, we 
conjecture that the theorem can in fact be strengthened to allow arbitrary forms of 
quantifying-in, but we have not yet found a proof one way or the other. 
So far in our complexity analysis, we have not allowed any explicit use of equality 
expressions. In the proof of Theorem 8. I 1, some equalities are introduced when resolving 
nested B’s with quantifying-in inside /3. Of course, allowing equalities of that type within 
/? explicitly does not affect decidability, since the proof would still go through. However, 
unrestricted use of equality expressions certainly destroys decidability because equality 
has its classical two-valued meaning. We are then left with two options. For one we 
can investigate restricted uses of equality which do not lead to undecidability. One such 
case obtains when the KB is of the form KB' A E, where KB' contains no equality and 
E is a conjunction of ground atomic equality expressions and their negations. Rather 
than allowing restricted uses of classical equality, one could also introduce an additional 
equality predicate with a weaker semantics. Exactly what such a semantics should look 
like is a challenging open problem. I4 
9. A KR service: ASK and TELL 
After a fairly lengthy excursion into non-standard modal logic, we now apply our 
results to the specification of routines to interact with a knowledge base. 
To that end, we use the methodology proposed in [30] which treats a KB as an 
abstract data type. The idea is that a user is given a set of RR service routines that 
I4 The obvious solution of a four-valued equality predicate without connection to the denotation function 
would work but would also be very uninteresting. 
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allow her to interact with a KB in a meaningful way. In particular, these routines are 
specified in terms of what the KB knows (the knowledge 1eveE) rather than how this 
knowledge is represented (the symbol level). l5 Of course, it is just as important to 
show exactly how the knowledge level specification can be realized at the symbol level, 
and it is at this level, where it makes sense to talk about the computational complexity 
of the KR service. 
We focus on two core operations, ASK and TELL, which allow a user to query a KB 
and to add new information to it. 
9.1. ASK 
ASK takes two arguments, an epistemic state represented by a set of situations M and 
a sentence (Y in an interaction language ZC, and it returns one of four answers: YES 
if (Y is believed to be true, NO if (Y is believed to be false, UNKnown if (Y is neither 
believed to be true nor believed to be false, and INConsistent if a is both believed to 
be true and false. 
The interaction language is restricted to the following subset of CIC. 
Definition 9.1 (The interaction language XL:). 
ZC=(LYEC3L\ a is an ordinary basic sentence without sk-functions}. 
As we noted earlier, not being able to refer to &x as a user is not really a restriction, 
since there is still an infinite supply of other function symbols available. Not being able 
to mention 0 within a query is a restriction, but it seems of minor importance, since 
ASKing whether something is all that is known has little practical value. l6 
Definition 9.2 (ASK at the knowledge level). Let S denote the set of all situations. 
ASK : 2’ x IL - {YES, NO, UNK, INC}, 
YES, if M+r Ba A ~Bla, 
ASK[M,a] = No’ 
if A4& 1Ba A BTZ, 
UNK, if A4kr 1Ba A TBW, 
WC, otherwise. 
Given this abstract characterization of ASK that makes no commitment as to how the 
epistemic state of the system comes about, we now turn to the case where epistemic 
states are represented by objective knowledge bases. 
First note that ASK is the only means by which a user is able to probe what the 
system believes. Thus, as far as the user is concerned, the epistemic state consists only 
I5 The terms knowledge and symbol level are due to Newell [ 361. 
I6 It would be much more interesting if we had operators that allowed us to talk about more focussed versions 
of only-believing such as: is this all you know about the driver of the red car? See [25] for a proposal in 
this regard. 
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of sentences in ZC. With this in mind, we call a set of sentences r an external belief 
set iff there is a set of situations M such that 
From the discussion in Section 7, it follows that objective sentences uniquely determine 
external belief sets in the sense that any two sets of situations that only-believe the same 
objective sentence agree on the corresponding external belief set (a direct consequence of 
Theorem 7.5). Therefore, objective sentences can be said to represent external belief sets. 
Given this notion of representation, it is not hard to give a symbol level account of 
ASK for objective existential-free KBS. In the next section, where we discuss TELL, we 
will see that the restriction to objective existential-free representations suffices for the 
given interaction language. For the following theorem, recall that X[KB ] is defined as 
{s 1 +I- f-1. 
Theorem 9.3 (ASK at the symbol level). Let KB be an ordinaol,, objective, and exis- 
tential-free sentence in (3C and let cy be in IL. 
( YES, $ b OKB 1 (Bcu A ~BT(Y), 
ASK[x[ KB] , a] = 
NO, if k OKB 1 (TB~~AB-xx), 
UNK, if + OKB 1 (7Ba A ~BYLY), 
INC. otherwise. 
Proof. It suffices to show the following. 
(1) !R[~~]&Baiff /=OKB >Ba. 
(2) !J~[KB]& 1Ba iff /= OKB 1~Ba. 
To prove the if direction of ( I ), let b OKB > Bru. If X[KB] is empty, then !J?[KB] k;T 
BCX holds vacuously. Otherwise, since R[KB] kr OKB, %[KB] & Ba follows by as- 
sumption. 
Conversely, let X[KB ] & Bcu. Since KB is objective, KB is determinate. There- 
fore, by Theorem 7.5, exactly one of /== OKB > Bcu and /= OKB > -Ba holds. Since 
%Z[KB] /==r Bcu by assumption, /= OK~ > Ba follows. 
The proof of (2) is analogous. 0 
While, in general, there are four possible answers that may be returned by ASK, 
there are cases where we can narrow the range of answers. For example, if X[KS] 
is empty, then ASK[[KB,~~ = INC for all sentences in IL. This can only occur if the 
KB contains an inconsistency that is due to equalities such as V’x(x # x). I7 Note 
that k OVJX(X + X) > (Ba A B7a) for all sentences cr in XC, since the only set of 
situations that supports the truth of OVx(x f X) is the empty set. If !R[KB] is not 
empty and the query is a subjective existential-free sentence, the answer is either YES or 
” An inconsistency due to predicates other than equality does not result in the empty set of situations. For 
example, R(P( n) A -P(n) ] consists of all situations that support both the truth and falsity of P(a), of which 
there are infinitely many. 
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NO because the KB has complete and accurate knowledge of subjective existential-free 
sentences (see Section 3.5.2). 
Finally, if the query is an existential-free sentence without function symbols using 
equality as the only predicate, the answer is YES or NO as well. This is no coinci- 
dence since, given a subjective existential-free sentence (7, ~[KB] bT CT iff !R[KB] kT 
Ilol(~,~l (Lemma 7.13), and (\g1(x2[al is an existential-free sentence without func- 
tion symbols using equality as the only predicate. 
9.1.1. Open queries 
Before we turn to the TELL operation, let us briefly consider one important extension 
to the ASK operation. So far, ASK handles only so-called Yes/No-questions, that is queries 
in the form of closed formulas. Often, however, one is interested in the individuals that 
satisfy a parametrized query, that is, a formula with free variables. For example, an 
appropriate answer to the query Teacher(x) consists of all the teachers that are known 
to the KB. Such queries are often referred to as Wh-questions. 
It is not hard to define a ASK wu operation using the existing machinery that we 
developed. Let KB be an ordinary, objective, and existential-free sentence in 0L: and let 
LY be a formula in ZL with free variables x = (xi,. . . , xk). Then let 
ASKwu@r,c~] = {n = (nl,. . . ,nk) Ik OKB 3 Ba[x/n]}. 
Note that the set returned by ASKwu may be infinite. For example ASKwu (rp’xP(x) , 
P(x)] = N. Nevertheless, it is possible to give a finite description of the answer set 
using the 11 . (( mechanism of Definition 7.10. Thus, an alternative definition of ASKwu 
would be 
In the above example, ASKwu ~xP( X) , P(x)] = (x = x) , from which the set of satisfying 
standard names can be read off. 
9.2. TELL 
TELLing the system a sentence cy means that the current epistemic state is transformed 
into a new state which reflects the changes that result from acquiring the belief (Y. 
Capturing this idea at the knowledge level is somewhat more complicated than in the 
case of ASK. The details are explained after the formal definitions are given. First, in 
contrast to ASK, it is necessary that the current state be representable in the following 
sense: 
Definition 9.4 (Representability). A set of situations M is representable iff there is an 
objective existential-free sentence KB such that M = !J?[KB] . 
Next, we need a way to uniquely pick new Sk-functions relative to a given sentence. 
Definition 9.5. Let sk_choose be a function that, when given any two formulas CY and 
/? in 0L, returns a sequence tsk of Sk-terms for the existentially quantified variables at 
the objective level of p such that none of the functions symbols in tsk occurs in LY. 
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Note that such a function sk_choose can easily be obtained by imposing an ordering 
on the Sk-functions and always picking the least available Sk-functions that do not appear 
in LY. The details are not important. For our purposes, all that matters is that such a 
function exists and is easily computable. 
Definition 9.6 (TELL at the knowledge level). Let M be representable. Then M& 
OKB for some objective existential-free KB in 0.C. Let LY be in ZL: with existentially 
quantified variables x at the objective level. Let tsk = sk_choose(KB, a), i.e., t,7k is a 
sequence of Sk-terms for x such that none of the Sk-functions in t,,k appears in KB. 
To better understand the definition, let us first look at the simpler case, where (Y does 
not contain existentially quantified variables at the objective level. In this case 
TELL[M, CII] = M fY {s ( M, skr a), 
which is of the same form as in the definition of TELL in [ 301. The intuition behind 
the intersection of A4 with another set is that an agent who acquires new knowledge 
does so by ruling out certain possibilities (situations). If (Y is objective, this amounts 
to ruling out all those situations that do not support the truth of LY. In case cz mentions 
beliefs, i.e., contains subformulas of the form By, these are interpreted with respect to 
the current epistemic state M. For example. if the only known teacher at M is John, 
TELL/M, Vx(BTeacher(x) > married(x) )I results in a new state that now believes 
that John is married. 
Note that the result of a TELL[[M,aIj may be the empty set if LY is an inconsistent 
subjective sentence such as BP(a) A 7BP(a) or an inconsistent sentence about equality 
such as VX(X f x). 
The occurrence of existentially quantified variables at the objective level of cy compli- 
cates the definition of TELL somewhat because existentials can only be known according 
to our logic if the system has a name (an admissible term) for the existential. Also 
these names must not reveal any information about the world. Thus, they are chosen to 
be Sk-terms (tsk) , which do not belong to the interaction language. 
Finally, it is necessary to choose Sk-terms that are not already in use at the current 
state M. For that reason, we restrict M to be representable, which allows us to determine 
which Sk-terms have been used so far (as given by KB). 
As noted in [ 30 1, there are other, more subtle reasons, why one should restrict TELL 
to representable sets. Roughly, if we allowed M to be representable by an infinite set 
of sentences, which Levesque calls w-representable, it may happen that the result of a 
TELL is no longer w-representable. 
Theorem 9.7 (TELL at the symbol level). Let KB be an ordinary, objective, and 
existential-free sentence and CY a sentence in ZC. Let x be the existentially quanti- 
fied variables at the objective level of cx and let tsk = sk_choose(m, a) be sk-terms for 
x which do not already occur in KB. Then TELL[%[ KB] , LYI] is representable and 
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Proof. Let TELL[!J?[KB] , a] = M. By Definition 9.6, M = R[KB] fl {s 1 !R[ KB] , s 
kT c~a[x/t,k]}. By Lemma 7.13, M = R[KB] n {s ( skT I\cx\~~Jz~KB~~[x/~,~]}. There- 
fore, M = (3 I sk-,. KB A ~I~JIZ(KESI j4 [~/t,kl). 0 
9.3. Decidability 
If we restrict ourselves to sentences in ZC without quantifying-in and equality, it is 
easy to see that TELL and ASK provide us with a decidable KR service. The argument 
goes as follows: 
(1) Creating an initial KBo is trivial. Simply let KE%a = true. 
(2) TELL is decidable. 
(a) For any objective KB and basic sentence in ZL without quantifying-in or 
equality, JJc~(l~l~l is computable. (See the argument in the proof of Theo- 
rem 8.10.) Actually, according to the definition of TELL and the initial KBO, 
the KB may well contain some equalities in the guise of true and false 
(recall that true = (# 1 = # 1) ) . However, such occurrences can always be 
easily eliminated or we obtain the trivial case where KB equals either true 
or false. 
(b) Choosing new Sk-terms for the existentially quantified variables in (( YJ]R[ m I 
is trivial. 
(3) ASK is decidable. This follows immediately from Theorem 8.10. 
Of course, the question is whether this KR service can be extended to handle a wider 
class of sentences without losing decidability. On the basis of Theorem 8.11, ASK can 
be extended to cover queries with quantifying-in restricted to universally quantified 
variables and we conjecture that arbitrary forms of quantifying-in do not result in 
undecidability either. As for TELL, the main restriction is that the new sentence that is 
added to the KB does not introduce arbitrary equality expressions. As noted at the end 
of Section 8, it is at least possible to allow atomic ground equality expressions and their 
negations. 
In summary, in this section we used OBLIQUE to provide a formal specification 
of a KR service consisting of routines ASK and TELL, which allow a user to query 
a KB and to add information to it. If the interaction language is restricted to sen- 
tences without equality and quantifying-in, the KR service is provably decidable. Based 
on results and conjectures of the previous section, we also briefly discussed possible 
extensions. 
9.4. An example 
Let us consider the following KB about teachers, employees and courses taught. Proper 
names and course numbers are assumed to be standard names. l8 
"We view the KB as a set of sentences keeping in mind that, strictly speaking, TELL and ASK require the 
KB to he in the form of a single sentence. 
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Teacher( Jack), Teacher( JiU) , Teacher($zther(Jill) ) , 
l&p(Juck), tip(M), Emp(Sue), 
KB = Jack # father( Jill), Jill # father( Jill), 
Teach( Jack, csc378), Teach( Jill, ~~484)~ 
Teach($ather(Jill) , ~~148) V TeachCfither( Jill), ~~228) / 
In the following, we consider answers to queries of the form ASK[KB, LY] for various LY. 
(1) LY = vx(Teacher( x) > Emp(x)). Answer: UNK. The answer is UNK because 
there may be teachers who are not known to the KB and who are not employees. 
(2) (Y = Vx(BTeacher(x) > Emp(x)). Answer: YES. Note the difference to the 
previous query. Here the KB is only asked about the known teachers, namely 
Jack and Jill. 
(3) (Y = V’xEmp(x) > Teacher(x). Answer: UNK. Similar to the first query, the 
answer is unknown because there may or may not be an employee who is not a 
teacher. 
(4) (Y = V’xBEmp( X) > BTeacher( x) Answer: NO. In this case the answer is clearly 
no because Sue, a known employee, is not among the known teachers. 
(5) LY = &Teacher(x) A TBTeacher(x). Answer: YES. The answer is yes because 
we know that the father of Jill is a teacher, but we do not know who he is. 
(6) (Y = 3xEmp(x) A 7BEmp( X) Answer: UNK. In contrast to the previous question, 
it is not clear whether there is an employee who is not yet known. 
Notice that without introspection none of the distinctions the previous queries exhibit 
would have been possible. Also, the answers would have been no different if we had 
used implicit instead of explicit belief. The next queries, however, demonstrate that 
explicit belief is indeed weaker. 
(7) cy = 3xTeachCfuther(Jill), x). Answer: UNK. The answer is unknown since 
disjunctive generalization does not hold in OBLIQUE. The failure of an inference 
due to existential generalization can be overcome, however, if we replace the 
original query by the following: 
(8) cy = 3xTeach(father(Jill), x) V 3yTeach(fiuther( Jill), y ) . Answer: YES. Note 
that (8) is equivalent to (7) in classical logic. Hence we observe that there are 
cases, where the answers to queries under implicit belief can be approximated 
by explicit belief by introducing additional disjunctions. 
(9) LY = Vx(BTeacher(x) > GlyTeach(x, v)). Answer: UNK. The answer is UNK 
in this case because there is no fixed term that can be substituted for y which 
would work for all known teachers. 
Since there are only two known teachers. a reformulation of the last query similar to 
(8) would also give us the answer YES. Alternatively, a YES answer would obtain as 
well if the KB contained 
favoritenourse( Jack) = 1~x378 A favoriterourse( Jill) = ~~484. 
In that case, favorite-course(x) is an admissible substitution for y when evaluating the 
query. 
While we have seen that the inability to apply existential generalization from dis- 
junctions can be overcome by modifying the query, such an approach will not work to 
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overcome the inability to apply modus ponens, which is probably the main weakness of 
the logic. For example, let us consider 
KB’ = KB U {VxTeacher( x) > Emp( x)}, 
that is, we add the taxonomic information that every teacher is also an employee. Then 
ASK@B’, EmpCfather(Jill))~ = UNK, 
even though both TeacherCfather(Jill) ) and TeacherCfather(Jill) ) > Emp&rher(Jill) ) 
are explicitly believed. In [ 291, Lakemeyer and Meyer address this weakness by mov- 
ing to a sorted logic, where unary predicates like Emp and Teacher are used as sort 
symbols. I9 Since sort symbols are given a classical two-valued semantics, the inference 
that Jill’s father is an employee will go through in this extended framework. Most im- 
portantly, it was shown that the decidability results of the unsorted case can be retained 
in the stronger sorted logic if the information about the two-valued sort symbols is 
restricted in an appropriate manner. In a nutshell, these restrictions require that there 
is no disjunctive information about sort symbols. Nevertheless this still allows fairly 
powerful taxonomic information to be represented. The exact limit of expressiveness, 
which would lead to undecidability, is still an open question. 
We conclude our discussion with a brief look at TELL. First note that TELLing a 
KB an objective sentence is rather trivial since we can just add that sentence directly 
except that every existentially quantified variable has to be replaced by an Sk-term. To 
illustrate how non-objective arguments are handled by TELL, let KB be the knowledge 
base introduced at the beginning of this subsection. 
( I ) TELLi-, lBTeach(Jill, csc340) > TTeach(Jill, ~~340)~ = KB A lTeach(JiEl, 
~~340). Here the KB is told to assume that Jill does not teach csc340 unless it 
already knows otherwise. 
(2) TELL[a, %Emp(x) A lBEmp( x) 1 = KB A (Teacher(a,k) A (ask # Jack) A 
(us& # Jill) A (ask # Sue)). 2o This time the KB is told that there is an 
employee other than the known ones. Given the current contents of the KB, this 
means that there is an employee other than Jack, Jill, or Sue. 
10. Summary and future work 
In this paper, we proposed a logic of explicit and implicit belief with full introspection. 
We considered a rich first-order language with function symbols, standard names, equal- 
ity and quantifying-in, which allows distinctions such as knowing that versus knowing 
who. While the semantics of implicit belief uses classical possible worlds, explicit belief 
is modeled by combining possible world semantics with ideas from relevance logic. By 
incorporating the notion of only-believing into the logic, we are able to completely spec- 
ify the beliefs of introspective first-order knowledge bases within the logic. An analysis 
of the complexity of reasoning of such D’S reveals that adding introspection to an 
I9 This extension is based on earlier work by Frisch [ 81. See also [ 371 for a different approach. 
” Occurrences of true and false introduced by RES$R[ KB] , BTeacher(x)] have been removed. 
246 G. Irrkemeyer/Artijiciul Intelligenc~e 84 (1996) 209-255 
existing model of limited deductive reasoning does not necessarily lead to an increase 
in complexity. As an application of our results we show how the logic can be used 
to formally specify interaction routines for limited introspective knowledge bases. The 
example KB we considered demonstrates that, while the underlying notion of belief is 
considerably weaker than the classical one, it is still possible to extract interesting and 
nontrivial information. 
There are various avenues for future research that come out of this work. For one, the 
decidability results should be extended. In particular, the question whether Theorem 8.11 
holds for sentences with unrestricted use of quantifying-in needs to be settled. We already 
mentioned our recent extension of OBLIQUE to a sorted logic, thereby strengthening 
the inferential power considerably. An interesting question is how far this approach can 
be pushed before decidability is lost again. 
Up to now we have completely neglected the fact that OBLIQUE is also an au- 
toepistemic logic (AEL). The main difference compared to standard AEL is, of course, 
that belief is no longer closed under classical logical implication. This opens the door 
for interesting complexity considerations similar to those that have been undertaken in 
propositional default reasoning, for example [ 141. In regular first-order AEL, there is 
little to talk about complexity-wise, since the deductive apparatus alone is already un- 
decidable. However, with OBLIQUE, we have an AEL where the deductive component 
restricted to objective sentences is decidable (ignoring equality for the moment). One 
question that seems worth investigating then is what kinds of default statements can be 
added to an otherwise objective knowledge base without losing decidability, or, where 
is the boundary between decidability and undecidability in terms of the various kinds of 
defaults in the first-order case? 
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Appendix A 
A.1. Properties of explicit beliej 
In order to prove many of the properties about explicit belief, it is useful to first show 
that, if a given situation supports the truth of a sentence with all existentials replaced 
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by admissible terms, then the situation also supports the original sentence, that is, when 
the existentials are treated as usual. The following three lemmas establish this result. 
Lemma A.1. Let CY be a formula with one free variable x and M a set of situations. 
Then for any situation s and closed term t such that d,(t) = n, 
(1) M,sb c$x/t]ifSM,&- ofi, 
(2) M, sbF a#x/tl ifs M, skF a;. 
Proof. By a simple induction on the structure of (Y (omitted). 0 
Corollary A.2. Let CY, M, s, and t be as above. Then 
M, si=:T LyI: x/t] implies M, sh 2~. 
Lemma A.3. Let LY be a sentence such that every variable at the objective level is 
bound exactly once. Let cy “YfY be (Y with 0 or 1 occurrences of 3xy at the objective 
level of CY replaced by y. Let t be a term such that a3”y’r[n/tl is a sentence. (In 
particular, any admissible term for x satisfies this condition.) Then 
(1) M&a 3Xy/Y[x/tl implies M, s(=~ (Y if 3xy occurs in an even number of l’s, 
(2) M& o 3”‘/Y[x/t) implies M, skF (Y if 3xy occurs in an odd number of 1’s. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of a. 
Base case: In the case of an atomic sentence, there are no occurrences of a subformula 
3x7 and the lemma holds vacuously. 
Case T(Y: ( 1) Let us assume that 3xy occurs in an even number of 7’s. If M, sh 
(-xY)~“Y/Y[~/~~ then M,skF 03Xy’y[ / 1 h x t w ere x now occurs in an odd number of 3 y 
7’s. Thus, by induction (2)) M, skF (Y and, therefore, M, sb ~a. 
(2) The argument is symmetric to ( 1) . 
Case aV/?: (1) Let M, s/=~ (~~Vp)~~~l~[x/t] Then M, s+~ o?XY/Y[x/t]or M, s+~ 
fTiqx/t’ By induction, M, sb a or M, s+~ p, which immediately implies M, s+~ 
(2)’ Analogous to ( 1) . 
Case 3ya: (1) If 3ya = 3x7, then the case reduces to Corollary A.2. Other- 
wise, let M, skT (3yar) 3”Y/qx/tl which is the same as M, sh 3y(ay3”~~Y)[x/t~ Then 
M, s+~ (&Y/Y [x/tl) [y/n] for some n E N. We can push the substitutions of y into 
the components, which is unproblematic because variables are assumed to be bound 
just once. Thus we obtain M, sb (a[ y/n] 3xy[y/n1/y[y/n1[x/t[ y/n] D. By induction, we 
obtain M, s+~ cz[ y/n] and, hence, M, s& 3ycu. 
(2) Since 3xy is assumed to occur within an odd number of l’s, 3xy must be 
properly contained in 3ycu. Let M, spF 3yo, that is, for some n E N, we have 
M, skF a[y/n] . By induction, M, skF (c.u[y/n] 3xy~y~n1~y[J’~n1[x/t[ y/n] J) and, there- 
fore, M, sFF ((Y~~Y/ _Isx/tb [y/n], which implies M, sFF 3y(a)3xrlyx/t] and, finally, 
M,sp, (3ya)3xy&/tC 
Case Ba: Since we only allow substitutions at the objective level, no substitutions 
can occur in this case and the lemma holds vacuously. q 
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Lemma A.4 Let a be a sentence such that every variable at the objective level is 
bound exactly once, Let x be a sequence of the existentially quantified variables at the 
objective level of LY. For any situation s and set of situations h4 and admissible terms t 
for x, 
if M, SF,,. cus[x/t] then M, .& a. 
Proof. By repeated application of Lemma A.3. 0 
Lemma A.5 (Subjective sentences are two-valued). Let IT be a subjective sentence, s 
a situation, and M a set of situations. Then 
Proof. By a simple induction on the structure of CJ (omitted). 0 
We now turn to the proofs of some of the properties of belief listed in Section 5.5.2. 
Perfect introspection 
(1) kB~a>BBcx, 
(2) + ~Bcx > BTBCX 
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the fact that there is a single, globally 
accessible set of situations. 0 
QuantijjGng-in 
(3) /= Ba; > 3xBcx, 
(4) /= 3xBcu 3, B3xa, 
(5) /= Ba,X > B3xa, 
(6) /== VxBct 3 B’v’n~u provided LY is existential-free, 
(7) b BV’xa > V’xBcu. 
Proof. The proofs are the same as for the logic BLS of [ 26,271. Here we prove 
properties (6) and (7): 
To prove property (6), let M/==, VXBCX Then, since LY is assumed to be existential-free, 
for all IZ E N and for all s E M, s+r a:. Therefore, for all s E M and for all n E N, 
s/=r ai, which implies Mk=T BVlxa. 
To prove property (7), let M/=r BVXCX. Then there are admissible t] , . . . , tk for the ex- 
istentially quantified variables XI, . . , Xk of (Y such that for all s E M, s/=r V’xffa [ tl, , . , 
tk]. This implies that for all s E M and for all n E N, sF~ (era [ tl , . . , tk I),“, which 
can be written as s/=r (ai)s[(tl),X,. , (tk);]. Therefore, M/=r Bcr; for all II E N 
because the (ti); are admissible for cui. M& VxBcu follows now immediately. 0 
Logical omniscience for subjective sentences 
(8) I= (B(p > a) A Bp) 1 Bo. 
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Proof. Let x, y, and z be the existentials in p, lp, and (+, respectively. Let Mh Bp and 
Mkr B( p > a). If M is empty, the statement holds vacuously. Otherwise, there are ad- 
missible t, u, and v such that for all s E M, M, S’F~ @[x/t! and M, sb (-p)#‘iy/u]V 
cd[z/vC By Lemma A.4, M, sb p and, by Lemma A.5, M, sF~ lp. Now assume that 
M, +r (-P)%Y/ u I f or some s E M. Then, by Lemma A.4, M,sb up, a contradic- 
tion. Thus for all s E M, M, sh crs[z/u] and, therefore, Mh BCT. 0 
Accuracy and (partial) completeness of subjective beliefs 
(9) + (Bp A TBfalse) > p. 
Proof. Let M+.T Bp A -Bf alse. Then M is non-empty. Then MkT p follows from 
Lemma A.4 and the fact that M, s+~ p is independent of the choice of s. 0 
( 10) k p > Bp provided p is existential-free. 
Proof. Immediate, since the proviso guarantees that p = pa. 0 
Relating only-believing and explicit belief 
(11) /=BBCY > La. 
Proof. Let M be any set of situations. We need to show that if Mb Ba then M+=T La. 
Thus, let us assume that MkT BCY and let x be the existentially quantified variables at the 
objective level of (Y. Then for some admissible t and for all s E M, M, s/=-r aa[x/tl 
By Lemma A.4, for all s E M, M, s+~ a and, therefore, for all worlds w E M, 
M, w+~ a, which immediately implies that M& Lcr. •i 
Relating explicit belief and implicit belief 
(12) /= Oa > Bcr. 
Proof. Follows immediately from the semantics of 0. 0 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 8.11 
For the proof of the theorem we need several definitions and lemmas. The reader is 
advised to skip these on a first reading and to start with the main proof of the theorem, 
consulting the lemmas and definitions as needed. 
Definition A.6. A standard name n occurs plain in a formula CY iff CY contains an equality 
expression (t = n) or (n = t). 
Definition A.7. For any formulas (Y and p, let N,Q be the set of all standard names 
occurring in cy or /3. 
Lemma A.& Let Y : N - N be a surjective function over the standard names. v is 
extended to apply to terms and formulas in the usual way. Let t? C N such that v\n 
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(Y restricted to fi) is bijective. (Such u I’$ always exists because u is assumed to be 
surjective. ) We write ti instead of v lb. 
For any situation s = (T, F: d) define a situation s, = (TV, F, , dp) s. t. 
P(n) E Tv(F,) iff WV(~)) E T(F) f or every primitive formula P(n) . 
Let d, be such thatfor all non-rigidclosed terms t, d,(t) = i/-‘(d(u( t))). (It is easy to 
show that such d, exists.) Finally, given any set of situations M, let M, = {sy / s E M}. 
Then for all objective (Y such that every =-expression in a is variable free and every 
standard name that occurs plain in a is a member of fi, 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of cr. First, it is easy to see that for 
any closed term u, v( d, (u) ) = d (v( u) ). For, if u is non-rigid, this follows immediately 
from the construction of d,. If u is a standard name, then the fact that denotation 
functions are the identity function when applied to standard names implies v(d,(u) ) = 
v(u) = d(v(u)). 
Case (Y atomic. Let (Y = P(t), where P is not the equality predicate. M,, s,/=r P(t) 
iff P(d,(t)) E TV iff P(v(d,(t))) t T (by definition of TV) iff P(d(v(t))) E T iff 
M, s/=r P(v(t)). The case M,, s,/=r P(t) is treated the same way. 
Let us now turn to the additional base case involving equality. Let t and t’ be closed 
terms. Since = is two-valued (an =-expression has true-support iff it does not have 
false-support), it suffices to prove the case of true-support. 
Let s,/=r t = I’. By the definition of =, d,(t) = d,(t’) and, therefore, v(d”(t)) = 
v(d,(t’)). Since v(d,(t)) = d(v(t)) and v(d,(t’)) = d(v(t’)), d(v(t)) = d(v(t’)), 
which implies s/=r v(t = t’). 
Conversely, let s/=-r v ( t = t’ ) : 
Case (i): Both t and t’ are non-rigid. Then, since d(v(t)) = d(v(t’)), d,(t) = 
ti-‘(d(v(t))) = ti-‘(d(v(t’))) =d,(t’), which implies s,/=r (t = t’). 
Case (ii): Both t and t’ are standard names. Then, since both t and t’ occur plain, 
t and t’ are members of I%‘. From d (v ( t) ) = d (v ( t’) > and the definition of denotation 
functions we obtain v(t) = v(t’). Then t and t’ are the same because ti = vlN is 
bijective, and s,/=r (I = t’) follows. 
Case (iii): t is a standard name and t’ is non-rigid. Then d,(t’) = i-‘(d(v(t’))) = 
I’-‘(v(t)) = t (since t E P?), which implies s,,kr (t = t’). 
Case (iv) : t is non-rigid and t’ is a standard name. This case is symmetric to case 
(iii). 
The cases for 7 and V follow easily by induction. 
Case 3xa. Let M,, s,,br 3xa. Thus for some n E N, M,, s,,/=.,- a; and, by induction, 
M, s/=r ~(a,*). (Note that the induction hypothesis applies because =-expressions in LY 
are assumed to be variable free.) M,s/=-, ~(a,“) can be rewritten as M,sk, ~(a):(,,,, 
from which M, s/=~ v( 3xa) follows. 
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Conversely, assume M, sb V( 3xcu). Then for some n E N, M, s/=.r Y (a):. Since v 
is surjective, there is an n’ E N such that n = v (n’) . Therefore, M, skr Y( a:,) and, by 
induction, M,, s, & a$,, which immediately implies M,, s,, k-,. 3xa. 
A similar argument proves that M,, sybF 3xcx iff M, skF V( 3x(u). 
Case Ba. Let My, sybT Ba. Then for some admissible t and for all s: E M,, 
M,, $,h a+g[tE By induction, M,s’~~ ~(&~[t)) for all s E M. Since 
&(v(t)) = ~(d~, (t)) for all closed terms t, we obtain that for all s’ E M, M, s’/=~ 
~(a)~s[v(t)b from which M.s~ v(Ba) follows. 
Conversely, let M, sbT v(Ba!). Then there are admissible t such that for all s’ E M, 
M, s’& ~(cx)“a[tl Since v is surjective, there are admissible t’ such that u(t’) = t. 
Therefore, for all s’ E M, M, s’+~ v(a) “a[ Y (t’) 1 Again using the fact that d, ( v (t) ) = 
y( dSY( t) ) for all closed terms t, we obtain that for all s’ E M, M, s’P~ Y( cP~[t’~. 
Thus, by induction, for all sk E M,, M,, sL~=~ c+~[t’~ from which My, sVkT Ba 
follows. 0 
Lemma A-9. Let CY be an ordinary, objective, and existential-free sentence such that 
all =-expressions in a are closed (no variables). Let p be an ordinary, objective, and 
quanti$er-free formula with free variables x = XI, . . . , Xk. Let J” = {n;, . . . , n;} be a set 
of standard names occurring nowhere in LY or p. Let I = {n 1 n E N and n occurs plain 
in cy or p} U J*. Then 
/= BLY > V’xBP ifs k Bcr > BP[x/n] for all n E Ik. 
Proof. The only-if direction follows directly from the meaning of V. 
To prove the if direction, let us assume that k Ba > Bp[x/n] for all n E Zk and 
FBa > VXBP. Then for some set of situations M and n’ = ni, . . . , ni, Mb Bcu and 
M&Bfi[x/n’]. Let J^= {Zr,... ,$} be the largest subset of {ni , . . . , rzk} such that 
.?n I = {}. By assumption, J^ is non-empty. Thus there is a set J” = {El, . . . , i&} s.t. 
IS J” and .irl(ni,..., nh} = {}. Note that, by the definition of I, if ?$ occurs in LY or 
/3, then Gi does not occur plain in LY or /?. 
Let us define a surjection v : N -+ N such that 
(1) ~(n)=nVfiEN,,~ (the standard names in LY and /I), 
(2) v(4) = %i Q2i E J, 
(3) v(nT) =nT Vn: E J* - J”, 
To apply Lemma A.8 let fi & N contain N,,p and {n 1 n f J* and v(n) @ N,,p} 
such that ti = VIA is bijective. (Since N,,p and {n ) n E J” and y(n) g! N,,p} are 
disjoint, such a ti always exists.) 
Mb BQ implies V’s E M, So Y(LY) because LY is existential-free and a = V(CY). If 
we define s,, for every s E M as in Lemma A-8, the lemma implies that Vs,, s,kT LY. 
If we let M, = {sV ) s E M}, M,,kT Ba follows. 
Also, by assumption M!& BP[x/n’]. First, we show that there is an n” E Zk s.t. 
v(n”) = n’. 
Case (i) : n: E I. Then choose nf’ = ni. For, if n: E N,,p and ni occurs plain in cy or 
PI y(4) = ni by construction of Y (condition ( 1)). Otherwise, if ni E J*, then ni $! j, 
then y( ni) = n: as well by construction of Y (condition (3) ) . 
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Cuse(ii):n~@f.Thenn~=~, forsomeZjijEThenletny=?zj (EJ*). 
Thus Mkr V( BP[ x/n”] > for some n” E I&, which implies that there is an s, E 
M, such that s,& /3[ x/n”] and, consequently, MVkr BP[ x/n”] contradicting the 
assumption that /= Ba > BP[x/n] for all n E Ik. 0 
Lemma A.lO. Let a and /3 be ordinary objective sentences without equality such 
that a is existential-free and /3 contains no universally quant$ed variables. Let x = 
(XI,..., x&) be a sequence of the existentially quanti$ed variables in p. Then there 
is a computable, finite set P of substitutions t for x such that for any substitution of 
closed terms t' for x, k BLY > B@[x/t’] iff t’ is a ground instance of some member 
of P. 
Proof. Without loss of generality, let cy = Vz ACY~ be in prenex conjunctive normal 
form. Let p’ = A pj be the matrix of p in conjunctive normal form. By a result in [ 271, 
/= BCI > BP iff there is a sequence of closed terms t such that for every /3j there are 
11 and ai such that cUi[z/U] C /?j[ x/t]. With that it is not hard to show that there is a 
finite set W of most general substitutions of x such that any t that satisfies the above 
subsumptions is an instance of a member of ly. The details of how to compute p can 
be found in Patel-Schneider’s t-entailment algorithm [ 37, pp. 37-381. 0 
Theorem 8.11. Let a be an ordinary objective sentence without equality Let p be an 
ordinary basic sentence without equality such that any free variable x in a subformula 
By in /I is a universally quantihed variable in /3. In other words, only universally 
quanti$ed variables may participate in quantifying-in. Then the validity of Ocz > BP is 
decidable. 
Proof. Let x be a sequence of the existentially quantified variables at the objective 
level of p. Let y be a sequence of the universally quantified variables at the objective 
level of p. As in the proof of Theorem 8.10, /= Oa > BP iff /= Bcu’ > B]]flJ(s~~~), 
where cy’ is LY with all existentials replaced by Sk-terms. Note that, in contrast to 
Theorem 8.10, lip]/ RR[~~) may contain equality expressions other than (# 1 = # 1) due 
to free variables in subformulas By. In particular, given the restrictions on p, it is 
easy to see that ]/p/l ~1~‘) contains only equality expressions of the form (t = t’), 
where t and t’ are either standard names or universally quantified variables. Similar 
to the proof of the previous theorem, it suffices to establish the decidability of the 
validity problem for Ba’ > BP’ for an arbitrary objective and existential-free LY’ and 
any objective /3’, whose equality expressions contain only standard names or universally 
quantified variables. A simple induction proof then establishes that /]/3]/~~~/) can be 
effectively computed. 
For any such p’, let p” denote its matrix. Let n;, . . . , nT be distinct standard names 
occurring nowhere in N,,pf and let I = {n ) n occurs plain in p’} U {n;, . , nr}. 
( 1) /= Bd > BP’ iff there are admissible terms t for x such that k Bcr’ > 
B,k?‘a [x/t] (Lemma 8.9). 
(2) Let t be any admissible sequence of terms for x. 
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j= BQ’ > B/3’s [ x/t] 
iff k Ba’ > BVy/3”[x/t] by Lemma 8.4 
iff k Bcu’ > VyB/?“[x/t] since + BVyZ3”[ x/t] E VyBP”[ x/t] 
iff for all n E I’, k Ba’ > B(p”[x/t]) [y/n] 
by Lemma A.9. 
(3) Next we show that one can always eliminate occurrences of equality expressions 
from P”[y/n]. Let n E I’. From the definition of ]].]]ata~) and the restrictions 
on /3 it follows that any equality expression in P”[y/n] is of the form (n = m) 
for standard names n and m. Since these have a fixed interpretation, we can 
replace them by true and false accordingly and then simplify the formula as 
in the proof of the previous theorem. Thus P”[y/n] reduces to true, false, or 
a sentence without occurrences of =. In the latter case, call @‘[y/n] nontrivial. 
(4) Let n E I’ be such that @‘[x/n] is nontrivial. By Lemma A.lO, there is a finite 
set !P( n) of most general substitutions for x such that for any closed terms 
t=(h,...,h), 
t= h’ 3 B(P”]+l) [y/n1 
iff t is a ground instance of a member of q(n) . 
We now transform each P(n) into a set f(n), which allows us later (part 
(5) (c)) to decide whether admissible terms t exist that work for all II E I’. 
Without loss of generality, let no two members of q(n) share any variables 
and let all variables be different from y. Let (tl , . . . , tk) E W(n), where ti is a 
substitution for the existentially quantified variable xi of p’ for 1 < i < k. A 
term 5 is called compatible with ti iff 
( 1) for any variable y E {yi , . . . , yl} that occurs in ti, xi is bound in p’ within 
the scope of y, 
(2) ;[y/n] = tj. 
Let a = (al,. . . , al) be distinct constants occurring nowhere in CY’ or /?‘. Let 
G(n) ={(~[y/u],...,~~[y/a]) I (tl,...,tk) ~?P(n)andzis 
compatible with ti for 1 < i < k}. 
(Note that the members of G(n) are obtained from those of P(n) by replacing 
some of the standard names in R by the corresponding constants in a. This is 
done to allow the unification of members of different s(n) .) Since P(n) is 
finite and for any ti there are only finitely many ways to obtain a compatible z, 
3(n) is also finite. 
(5) We are now ready to prove the decidability of the question: does there exist a 
sequence of admissible t such that for all n E I’, b Ba’ > B( p”[ x/t] ) [y/n] ? 
(a) First check whether there are it E I’ such that @‘[y/n] reduces to false. 
In such a case, ~Bcx’ > B(p”[x/t]) [y/n] for all admissible t. Therefore, 
by part ( 1) and (2)) FB,’ > BP’ and we are done. 
(b) For any II E I’ such that @‘[y/n] reduces to true, we have + Bn’ > 
B(p”[x/t] ) [y/n] for all admissible t. 
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(c) Thus it suffices to show the decidability of the question: does there exist a 
sequence of admissible t such that for all II E I’ with a nontrivial /?“[ x/n], 
k Ba’ > B(p”[x/t] ) [y/n]. We no,w show that such a t exists iff one can 
pick one element from each of the P(n) and unify them. Since the P(n) 
are finite and can be effectively computed, decidability follows. 
(i) If direction: For all n, let t, E G.(n) and assume the t, unify. Then 
there exists a most general instance t of all the t, and let t’ be a 
ground instance of t obtained by replacing_ the variables by arbitrary 
standard names. By construction of the P(n), t’[ a/y] is admissi- 
ble for x in /3’, and for all n E I’ with a nontrivial P”[x/n], k 
B~‘~B(p”[X/(t’Ia/yl) I) [u/n]. 
(ii) Only-if direction: Let t be admissible such that for all n E I’ with 
a nontrivial ,B”[y/n], k Ba’ > B(/?‘[x/t])[y/n]. Thus for every 
II E f’ with a nontrivial @‘[x/n], t[y/n] is an instance of some 
t,z E P(n). In other words, the t, unify. Then for each t, there is an 
t; E g.(n) such that t [y/a] is a unifier of these tk. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 8. I I. Cl 
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